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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over requests for judicial review of hazardous waste 
permitting decisions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l(l)(b), 63-46b-l(2)(k), 
63-46b-16(l) (1997), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996). 
n . ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Have Petitioners provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate they have standing to 
bring this action? 
Standard of Review: Because the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (Board) 
made no determination regarding standing, there is no decision to review. However, because 
this is a question of law and impacts jurisdiction, it may be decided in the first instance by this 
Court. See Sierra Club v. Department of Envtl. Quality. 857 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1993). 
B. Did the Board abuse its discretion when it refused to revoke a hazardous waste permit 
or deny a permit modification for alleged failure to comply with the terms of the permit, or 
applicable rules and statutory requirements? This issue applies to Petitioners' argument that 
the Tooele Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facility (TOCDF) permit should be revoked and 
necessary permit modifications denied due to various operational failures alleged by 
Petitioners, which Petitioners consider to be violations of the permit, and applicable rules and 
statutes. The issue also applies to Petitioners' argument that EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. 
(EG&G) should be denied a permit because it operated without a permit for a long period. 
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Standard of review: The legislature has explicitly granted discretion to the Board to 
determine when to take action to revoke a permit for failure to comply with the terms of that 
permit. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(12) (1995 and Supp. 1997). The Board also has broad 
statutory authority to make rules outlining the terms and conditions for permit approval, 
disapproval, and revocation. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-105(l)(e) (1995). Among the rules it 
has made is Utah Admin. Code R315-3-10(a) (1997), which establishes a duty to comply with 
permit requirements and states that violation "is grounds for enforcement action; for plan 
approval termination, revocation and reissuance, or modification; or for denial of a plan 
approval renewal application." IcL (emphasis added). Again, the language is discretionary. 
The legislature has given the Board broad discretion to determine what kinds of 
violations are worthy of an action against the permit or permit application. This degree of 
discretion is appropriate for a power that is essentially prosecutorial in nature, and the abuse 
of discretion standard should therefore apply. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1997); 
Tasters Ltd.. Inc. v. Department of Employment Security. 863 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 
1993).1 
1
 The abuse of discretion standard outlined in Tasters should survive the standard of 
review changes made in Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 939 P.2d 177, 181, n. 6 (Utah 
1997) because this determination involves the use of enforcement authority with a range of 
allowable outcomes. It does not simply involve applying the law to a set of facts to get a 
correct result. However, even if Drake governs, it is appropriate for this Court to grant a 
large amount of "operational discretion" to the agency given the degree of discretion granted 
by the legislature, and given the prosecutorial nature of the decision being made. See 
discussion in Section n.C, supra. 
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C. Did the Board have sufficient evidence to support its conclusion that operation of the 
Tooele Chemical Agent Demilitarization Facility will not pose a threat to human health or the 
environment, as required by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 19-6-108(9)(b) (1995 and Supp. 1997), and Utah Admin. Code R315-3-20(b)(5)(ii) (1997), 
and that releases from the facility will be minimized as required by Utah Admin. Code 
R315-8-3.2 (1997). 
Standard of Review: This is a question that requires the application of a legal standard 
to a set of facts. The Board's Findings of Fact should be accepted as conclusive given 
Petitioners' failure to marshal the evidence. Crapo v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 922 P.2d 
39 (Utah App. 1996). If the findings of fact are not accepted as conclusive for this reason, 
they will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Drake v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994)). 
The application of law to facts is subject to a correction of error standard as a question 
of law. IcL Nevertheless, the reviewing court may grant some "operational discretion" to the 
agency and, depending on the amount of discretion granted, will review the agency's decision 
using a correctness standard, an abuse of discretion standard, or a standard between those 
extremes. Id. 
This case involves complex hazardous waste permitting decisions over which the 
legislature has granted the Board broad discretion. Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-104(l)(f), 
19-6-104(l)(k), 19-6-105(l)(a), and 19-6-105(l)(e) (1995 and Supp. 1997). Members of the 
Board are required to "be knowledgeable about solid and hazardous waste matters." Utah 
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Code Ann. § 19-6-103(2) (1995 and Supp. 1997). Several of the members must be from 
positions that would give them particular expertise. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-103(1) and (2)(c), 
(d), and (f) through (h) (1995 and Supp. 1997). For these reasons, it is appropriate in this 
case for the Court to grant substantial operational discretion to the Board, and therefore to 
review the Board's decision with considerable deference. 
D. Did the Board afford Petitioners a reasonable opportunity to present their case, in 
compliance with constitutional due process requirements and Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-8 
(1997)? 
Standard of Review: A reviewing court will grant relief only if Petitioners 
demonstrate that agency failed to follow prescribed procedures and they were "substantially 
prejudiced" by that failure. Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16(4) (1997); D.B. v. Division of 
Occupational and Prof 1 Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah App. 1989). 
III. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Determinative law is set forth in Addendum A. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Before the Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board 
The Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board concurs with the characterization of the 
nature of the case and the proceedings below in the brief submitted by the Respondents U.S. 
Army and EG&G Defense Materials, Inc., with the following addition: 
The permit and permit modifications challenged by Petitioners were issued by the 
Executive Secretary pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-l(2)(k) (1997), which allows the agency to issue initial notices of violation or 
orders without complying with the requirements of UAPA. The hearing conducted by the 
Board was a de novo hearing on the issues raised by Petitioners. The same UAPA provision 
mandates that UAPA govern the conduct of that hearing. 
On April 17, 1997, the Board voted to uphold the Executive Secretary's permitting 
decisions. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on May 21, 1997. The Board issued its 
written Order on July 22, 1997. The Board's Order (Index No. JR-173) is included as 
Addendum B to this brief. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board concurs with the statement of facts in 
the brief submitted by the Respondents U.S. Army and EG&G Defense Materials, Inc., with 
the following additions: 
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1. Utah's Hazardous Waste Program 
The United States Congress, concerned over the potential for improper management of 
hazardous waste to injure human health and the environment, passed the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1980. RCRA is codified under the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 through 6992k (1994 and Supp. 1997). RCRA directs the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to oversee the management of 
hazardous waste throughout the nation and provides for delegation of the RCRA program to 
States that become authorized to administer it. Utah has been authorized by the EPA to 
administer the hazardous waste program in the State. 
The Utah legislature enacted the Solid and Hazardous Waste Act (SHWA) in 1981 to 
provide a statutory and regulatory system for oversight of the treatment, storage, and disposal 
of hazardous waste. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-101 through 19-6-123 (1995 and Supp. 1997) 
(formerly codified under different section numbers within Title 26). The SHWA implements 
the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for the State of Utah. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 19-6-104(l)(i) (1995 and Supp. 1997). 
The legislature created the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board to 
administer the SHWA, promulgate rules, and set policy within the limitations of the SHWA. 
The Board is made up of thirteen members: two representatives of municipal and county 
government; four members of the public, including a representative of organized 
environmental interests; a registered professional engineer; a representative of a local health 
department; four representatives of various industries whose activities are governed by the 
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SHWA; and the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Environmental Quality. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 19-1-103 and 19-6-106 (1995). 
The legislature delegated considerable authority to the Board to implement the SHWA. 
For example, the Board may: conduct inspections; hold hearings at which it may receive 
evidence it finds proper; issue orders, which it can enforce through administrative or judicial 
proceedings; settle or compromise compliance proceedings; require permit applicants to submit 
specifications and information; approve or disapprove permit applications and revoke or 
review permits. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-104 (1995 and Supp. 1997). The SHWA uses the 
term "plan approval" rather than "permit," but these terms are equivalent and the term 
"permit" is used in this brief. Utah Admin. Code R315-1-1 (d) (1) (1997). 
The legislature also created the office of Executive Secretary to the Board and allowed 
the Board to delegate to the Executive Secretary the authority to perform many of its functions 
under its administrative control. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-107 (1995). The Executive 
Secretary is also the Director of the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (Division). 
The Division staff does the day-to-day work of the Board and the Executive Secretary, such as 
writing permits, inspecting facilities, and overseeing compliance with the SHWA, 
administrative rules, and permits. 
"Hazardous waste" is statutorily defined at Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102 (9) (1995 and 
Supp. 1997). Utah Admin. Code R315-2-3 (1997) refines the statutory definition. In general, 
the Board has adopted EPA's definitions of hazardous waste, but it has added to its definition 
three wastes not regulated by EPA: the military chemical agents GB (nerve agent), VX (nerve 
agent) and Mustard (H, HD, HT). Utah Admin. Code R315-2-11 (e) (1)(1997). 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners' only evidence of standing in this case is unsupported allegations that 
members live and use property near TOCDF. They have not demonstrated that they have a 
personal stake in the outcome of this dispute, or that they meet any of the other requirements 
for standing. 
B. Petitioners did not marshal the evidence contrary to their positions, but instead 
presented a very one-sided version of the evidence adduced below. The Board's Findings of 
Fact regarding this matter should be accepted as conclusive given this failure to marshal the 
evidence. 
C. The Board did not abuse its discretion when it determined that operation 
incidents did not warrant an enforcement action against the TOCDF facility to revoke its 
permit, or to deny it essential permit modifications. The Board also did not abuse its 
discretion when it determined that EG&G should be granted an operating permit 
notwithstanding Petitioners' claim that EG&G had been illegally operating TOCDF prior to 
being granted an operating permit. 
D. The Board's Findings that the Division's screening risk assessment was 
properly performed and conservatively estimated risk should be accepted as conclusive given 
Petitioners' failure to marshal the evidence. The Findings should also be upheld by this Court 
because there is ample evidence to support them. 
E* The transcript shows that the Board granted Petitioners substantial amounts of 
additional time beyond Petitioners' initial twelve hours and otherwise worked to accommodate 
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Petitioners' concerns without losing control of the proceeding. Petitioners' own strategic 
choices are responsible for any failure by Petitioners to present their case. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Petitioners Have Failed to Demonstrate Standing. 
Petitioners must demonstrate standing in order to bring an appeal before this Court. 
Their only attempt to do so is found in their two Requests for Agency Action, each of which 
contains general allegations that Sierra Club, Vietnam Veterans of America, and the Chemical 
Weapons Working Group have members living in and using areas that would be affected by 
the TOCDF facility. (Index No. IR-1, at 2-3, and Index No. IR-2 at 2-5; these documents are 
also included, without their attachments, as Addenda C and D to this brief.) 
General allegations such as those found in Petitioners' Requests for Agency Action are 
not adequate to show standing. A complainant must meet one of three standards. It must 
show that it has "some distinct and palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute." Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983); Terracor 
v. Board of State Lands and Forestry. 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted). A 
"general interest [it] shares in common with members of the public at large" is not adequate to 
show standing. Jenkins. 675 P.2d at 1148-49. A requirement implied by the "personal stake" 
requirement is that there must be a causal relationship between an injury alleged by a 
complainant and each action challenged. Sierra Club. 857 P.2d at 986 (Utah App. 1993) 
(challenge to emergency coordination). For example, in this case, Petitioners have challenged 
the Division's screening risk assessment for failure to include various exposure scenarios. In 
9 
order to establish a causal relationship, Petitioners must show that any such failure directly 
injures their members.2 They must show, for example, that they have members whose risk is 
underestimated in the screening risk assessment. A general desire to shut down the plant in 
order to avoid other injury is not adequate to confer standing. IdL 
If the complainant is unable to demonstrate such a personal stake, standing may still be 
granted to an organization if it can show "no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of 
the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has 
standing to raise the issue," or that "the issues are unique and of such great public importance 
that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public interest." Tgrracor, 716 P.2d at 799; 
see also Jenkins. 675 P.2d at 1148-50. 
The Petitioners' standing was not considered by the Board below, although the 
Executive Secretary did warn the Board (and therefore the parties) in his Prehearing Brief that 
an appellate court would look to the record for evidence of judicial standing. (Index No. 
IR-138, at 13, n. 4.) Although the Board may have the authority to consider a challenge to a 
permit without considering whether the challenger has judicial standing, this Court will not 
adjudicate a case where the complainant has no standing. Sierra Club v. Department of Envtl. 
Quality. 857 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1993). Given the evidence in this case that there is far 
greater risk from continued storage of chemical weapons than from their incineration (see 
2
 In addition to these requirements, an organization must demonstrate that it has 
standing by showing that "the individual members of the association have standing to sue" and 
that "the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation 
of each injured party indispensable to the proper resolution of the cause." Society of Prof 1 
Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). 
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Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 6, Findings of Fact paragraph 17), it is 
particularly appropriate that Petitioners be required to show they have members supporting 
this petition for review who allege injury that is caused by the actions Petitioners challenge. 
Petitioners provided no such evidence below, and they cannot do so now. 
B. The Board's Findings of Fact Should Be Accepted Due to Petitioners' Failure to 
Marshal the Evidence 
In order to challenge findings of fact made by an administrative agency, a challenger 
must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts and in light of the conflicting evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n and Union Pacific. 919 P.2d 547, 554 
(Utah 1996); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). 
Findings will be accepted as conclusive if this burden is not met. Crapo v. Industrial Comm'n 
of Utah. 922 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1996); Intermountain Health Care v. Board of Review of the 
Indus. Comm'n. 839 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992). 
Petitioners in their Opening Brief failed to marshal any evidence in support of the 
Board's decision, but instead presented only an extremely one-sided version of the evidence. 
For example: 
• Petitioners state that the health risk assessment prepared by the Division "irrefutably" 
shows that TOCDF creates a cancer risk above the Division's own standard for the 
breast feeding infant/child of a non-subsistence farmer (Petitioners' Opening Brief at 
36), ignoring the evidence presented that the screening risk assessment was 
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conservative because it intentionally overestimated exposure. See infra at Section 
VI.D. 
• Petitioners argue that the screening risk assessment is inadequate because it fails to take 
into consideration open burning/open detonation activities planned for the Facility 
(Petitioners' Opening Brief at 22), ignoring the evidence that the Executive Secretary 
had ordered the Army to cease its open burning/open detonation activities until a risk 
assessment showed that those activities could take place without creating unacceptable 
risk. (E.g., Index No. IR-164 at 1050-1051.) 
• Petitioners have argued that TOCDF would violate dioxin exposure standards 
established by the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (Petitioners' 
Opening Brief at 19), ignoring evidence that there is substantial disagreement in the 
scientific community about the toxicity of dioxin, and that the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency has therefore not yet established an acceptable exposure level. 
(E.g.. Affidavit of Chris Bittner, Index No. IR-138A, at paragraph 18.) 
• Petitioners argue that the Division ignored evidence of local dairy consumption in 
preparing its risk assessment (Petitioners' Opening Brief at 22), ignoring evidence that 
the information relied upon by Petitioners was provided to the Division as a "rough 
draft or a place to start as far as [the Division's] inquiry into the practices in Rush Valley" 
(Index No. IR-164 at 993), that Division employees searched for individuals consuming 
locally-produced dairy products and found none, and that those employees consulted 
with an agriculture extension agent from Utah State University who informed them that 
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the area was not appropriate for dairy production. (E.g., Index No. IR-164 at 
992-994.) 
Given the Petitioners' failure to marshal the supportive evidence, the Board's Findings 
of Fact should be accepted as conclusive. Those findings are highlighted in Sections VI.D and 
E, infra. 
C. The Board Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Refused to Revoke the Facility's 
Permit or Deny Critical Permit Modifications for Alleged Violations of the Permit 
or Other Applicable Law. 
Petitioners' appeal challenges the Board's refusal to terminate TOCDF's original 
permit and its refusal to deny critical permit modifications. That challenge is based in part on 
the EG&G's alleged operation of the facility without a permit and upon other alleged 
violations (Petitioners' Opening Brief at 34, 39-40), presumably related to operational 
incidents outlined in Section IV.B.2.C. Q± at 25-30). The Board agrees that it has discretion 
to revoke or refuse to grant a permit or permit modification based on the owner or operator's 
compliance history. The Board does not agree, however, that it is required to do so even if 
the facility has violated permit conditions or other legal requirements. The language of the 
statute is clearly discretionary, not mandatory: 
Approval of a nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation plan may be 
revoked, in whole or in part, if the person to whom approval of the plan has 
been given fails to comply with that plan. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(12) (1995 and Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). 
Petitioners rely on Utah Code Ann.§ 19-6-108(10)(c) in arguing that permit revocation 
and permit modification denial is appropriate, but that provision does not apply. It provides: 
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(10) The executive secretary may not approve a commercial nonhazardous solid 
or hazardous waste operation plan . . . unless it contains the information 
required by the board, including: . . . (c) compliance history of an owner or 
operator of a proposed commercial nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste 
treatment, storage, or disposal facility, which may be applied by the executive 
secretary in a nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation plan decision, 
including any plan conditions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-108(10)(c) (1995 and Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). This provision 
applies only to commercial facilities- facilities built to manage waste in order to earn a profit.3 
It does not apply to facilities such as TOCDF which are designed to manage wastes created 
and owned by the owner or operator. Even if the provision did apply, it requires only that 
information be provided. It does not require that a particular result should apply if an 
applicant has had compliance problems. 
3
 Although the term "commercial hazardous waste facility" is not explicitly defined, 
apparently through oversight, it is reasonable to use a definition parallel to that for a 
commercial solid waste facility: 
"Commercial nonhazardous solid waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility" 
means a facility that receives, for profit, nonhazardous solid waste for 
treatment, storage, or disposal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102(3)(a) (1995 and Supp. 1997). The term "commercial hazardous 
waste facility" is also implicitly defined in section 19-6-118(l)(a) of the SHWA: 
An owner or operator of any commercial hazardous waste or mixed waste 
disposal or treatment facility that primarily receives hazardous or mixed wastes 
generated by off-site sources not owned, controlled, or operated by the facility 
or site owner or operator, and that is subject to the requirements of Section 
19-6-108, shall collect the fee under Subsection (2) from the generator. 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-118(l)(a) (1995 and Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). The TOCDF 
facility does not fit within either of these definitions. 
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The Board's thoughtful questioning of witnesses throughout the hearing (e.g.. Index 
No. IR-163 at 530-541; IR-164 at 961-978), its careful deliberations (Index No. IR-169 at 
1154 through 1218) and its "Order/ (Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B) make clear that the 
Board carefully considered the alleged failures, both individually and collectively, and 
concluded that any action against the permit was unwarranted. Petitioners have not 
demonstrated any abuse of discretion by the Board in failing to terminate TOCDFs permit or 
deny it necessary permit modifications. The Board's decision should therefore be respected. 
D. The Evidence Supports the Board's Conclusion That TOCDF Operations Do Not 
Threaten Human Health or the Environment and That Releases from TOCDF 
Have Been Minimized 
1. The Screening Risk Assessment Was Properly Performed and 
Conservatively Estimates Risk from Exposure to TOCDF Emissions. 
Petitioners rely heavily upon their re-interpretation of the Division's Screening Risk 
Assessment (SRA), and drafts of that SRA, to support their contention that emissions from 
TOCDF will endanger human health and the environment in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
19-6-108(9)(b) (1995 and Supp. 1997), and Utah Admin. Code R315-3-20(b)(5)(ii) (1997). 
With respect to these allegations, the Board made the following findings of fact: 
• "The SRA followed applicable EPA guidance." Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and 
Addendum B at 4, paragraph 11. 
• "In keeping with EPA guidance and current risk assessment practice, the SRA used 
conservative assumptions to determine the resulting risk estimates . . . ." Board's 
Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 5, paragraph 12. 
• "With respect to cancer effects of dioxin, the risk assessment used EPA's current 
conservative methodology to calculate overall cancer risks from TOCDF emissions and 
found that the overall cancer risks do not exceed EPA guidance levels for ten, fifteen 
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and thirty year operating periods. The SRA did not include a calculation of non-cancer 
effects of dioxin exposure because EPA had not adopted a reference dose for dioxin." 
Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 5, paragraph 14. 
• "There is insufficient evidence to conclude that low level exposure to dioxin that may 
be caused by operation of the facility will cause, or are [sic] likely to cause, adverse 
human health effects." Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 6, 
paragraph 16. 
•
 n[T]he Screening Risk Assessment was performed using applicable EPA guidance and 
met all requirements for a health risk assessment. The SRA indicates that TOCDF can 
be operated as designed within the risks established by EPA for emissions as set forth 
in the design and construction." Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 
11, paragraph 6.4 
Using these findings of fact, the Board concluded that the preponderance of the evidence 
supports the Executive Secretary's approval of TOCDF's trial burn plans, permit and permit 
modifications. (Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 11, paragraph 8.) 
The Board's findings of fact should be accepted as conclusive given Petitioners' failure 
to marshal the evidence. See Section VLB., supra. It is also appropriate for this Court to 
grant some "operational discretion" to the Board, and therefore to grant its application of these 
facts to the law some deference. Drake. 939 F.2d at 181. 
Even absent such a presumption, the Board's position should still prevail. Ample 
evidence was adduced to show that the screening risk assessment conservatively estimates risk. 
For example, Division toxicologist Chris Bittner explained that the TOCDF Screening Risk 
Assessment was biased to avoid underestimating- and probably overestimates- risk. (Index 
No. IR-138A, at 2, 3, paragraphs 9 and 12.) Division risk assessment contractor Helen 
4
 The findings in this paragraph are found in that portion of the Board's order entitled 
"Conclusions of Law and Reasons for Decision"; however, they are clearly findings of fact. 
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Sellers also explained that the TOCDF Screening Risk Assessment generally overestimated 
risk. (Index No. IR-164 at 965, 966, 971, and 972.) Given these conservative inputs, it is not 
scientifically possible to use the SRA to show that anyone is endangered. This SRA, like any 
screening risk assessment, can only be used to show that a particular risk level is not 
exceeded. 
There is also ample evidence to show that the screening risk assessment was properly 
performed using EPA guidance (Affidavit of Chris Bittner, Index No. IR-138A, at paragraphs 
4, 9, 14), and showed that risks from TOCDF emissions would not exceed Division and EPA 
standards (Id. at paragraphs 14 and 20). The record also gives substantial evidence for 
rejecting the dioxin level limits that Petitioners would have liked the SRA to use QcL at 
paragraphs 17 and 18). 
Petitioners have pointed to no statutory or regulatory provision requiring performance 
of a screening or other risk assessment; there is no such requirement. Ordinarily the Division 
relies on compliance with regulatory requirements to protect human health and the 
environment. In this case, however, the Executive Secretary chose to perform a screening risk 
assessment to afford an additional level of assurance appropriate to the nature of the facility. 
(Affidavit of Dennis R. Downs, IR-138B at 3, paragraph 11.) 
2. Incidents at the Facility Do Not Demonstrate That TOCDF Operations 
Threaten Human Health or the Environment, or That Releases Have Not 
Been Minimized. 
Petitioners rely in large part on evidence of alleged violations of the permit, hazardous 
waste rules, or state statutes to support their argument that TOCDF operations threaten human 
health or the environment, and fail to minimize releases. As described in Section VI.C of this 
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brief, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the Board abused its discretion when it considered 
these incidents and determined to take no action. 
Even if a less deferential standard of review is used, however, Petitioners' argument 
must fail. With respect to these allegations, the Board made the following findings: 
• "The Board finds that the facility does not pose an imminent threat to human health or 
and the environment, that TOCDF can prevent or minimize releases, that the facility 
can achieve the required DRE, and that it meets emergency preparedness requirements. 
With proper responses to incidents or concerns, appropriate reviews and changes in or 
temporary suspensions of operations, the Army and EG&G have operated the facility in 
such a way as to minimize the release of hazardous waste and to avoid imminent 
hazards and mitigate nay impacts to public health." (Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 
and Addendum B at 4, paragraph 10.) 
• "Petitioners did not present evidence that either the Army or EG&G has had a poor 
compliance history on safety and environmental issues or has failed to comply with 
legal or permit requirements in connection with TOCDF. The Board finds no evidence 
sufficient to justify revocation or termination of the Army and EG&G's permit on these 
grounds." (Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 7, paragraph 18.) 
• "Operations at TOCDF during the shakedown period have proceeded deliberately to 
ensure that full-scale operations will be conducted in a manner that maximizes the 
protection of TOCDF workers, the public and the environment." (Board's Order, Index 
No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 7, paragraph 20.) 
Both findings of fact and findings applying law to facts are included in these determinations by 
the Board. To the extent the Board has made findings of fact, they should be accepted as 
conclusive given Petitioners' failure to marshal the evidence. See Section VLB., supra. 
Together with the findings applying law to facts, which should be granted some deference for 
reasons described supra at Section VI.C, these findings are sufficient to overcome Petitioners' 
objections to facility operations. 
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E. The agency appropriately issued a permit modification that included EG&G as an 
operator. 
The Board agreed with the Executive Secretary's position that, because use of 
subcontractors or contractors is not unusual, and because the Army had ultimate responsibility 
for the TOCDF facility and was permitted as its owner and operator, it was not necessary for 
EG&G to be permitted as well. Board's Order, Index No. IR-173 and Addendum B at 9, 
paragraphs 1 and 2. The Board found that the Executive Secretary had properly exercised his 
discretion in adding EG&G as a co-permittee. LI 
Even if Petitioners had established that EG&G should have been permitted, however, 
they have not and cannot show that such a breach necessarily requires denial of a request to be 
included as a co-permittee, or that failure to deny such a request is an abuse of the Board's 
discretion. See part IV.C, supra. The Board's exercise of discretion is particularly 
appropriate in this case, where the Executive Secretary testified that it was his understanding 
of the law that EG&G did not need to be permitted. It would be particularly unreasonable to 
apply the harshest of administrative remedies against EG&G for acting in accordance with an 
understanding of the law that was shared by the head of the agency responsible for enforcing 
hazardous waste laws. 
F. The Board Did Not Violate Petitioners' Procedural Rights by Limiting the Time 
Granted Petitioners to Present Their Case. 
Constitutional due process requires a "fair trial in front of a fair tribunal," including 
"the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way/ In Re: Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 
1996). These requirements are refined in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 
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which provides a statutory right to a hearing, and a statutory right to present evidence and 
conduct cross-examination at that hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(l)(a), (d) (1997). 
Obviously, those rights are not unlimited. UAPA explicitly allows the presiding officer to 
regulate the course of the hearing to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present 
their positions. IcL Petitioners have not demonstrated that they were denied that opportunity; 
they have not even described the nature of the evidence that would have been adduced had they 
been granted the additional time they request.5 
The Board in this case did afford a reasonable opportunity to Petitioners to present 
their case. Twelve hours, the amount of time initially allotted to Petitioners to present their 
case (Index No. IR-162, at 5, lines 6 through 9) is a substantial amount of time. The Board 
did not require Petitioners to stop at twelve hours, however. It granted Petitioners significant 
amounts of additional time on several occasions. (Index No. IR-163 at 527, 528, and 543 (15 
additional minutes), IR-164 at 731, 732, and 738 (30 additional minutes), IR-164 at 986, 990, 
1004, 1012, 1016, 1020, 1026, 1031, 1040, 1043, 1051, and 1059 (Petitioners allowed to ask 
additional questions although their time had elapsed); see Board Counsel's recapitulation of 
time Petitioners were granted, Index No. IR-164 at 1090-1092.) 
In addition, the other parties gave up some of their own time for Petitioners' use. 
(Index No. IR-164 at 721 (Executive Secretary grants Petitioners 15 minutes to cross examine 
5
 Petitioners did note three instances where witnesses responded to questions asked by 
identifying other individuals who could better answer the question. Petitioners' Opening Brief 
at 31. In the absence of deposition or other testimony, however, Petitioners cannot proffer 
testimony, and any assertion that responses from those individuals would be helpful to their 
case is mere speculation. 
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Helen Sellers); Index No. IR-164 at 905 (Executive Secretary grants Petitioners another ten 
minutes to examine Helen Sellers); Index No. IR-164 at 769 (Army/EG&G grant Petitioners 
ten minutes); Index No. IR-164 at 905-906 (Army and EG&G grant Petitioners an additional 
30 minutes).) 
Finally, the Board allowed Petitioners to submit over five inches of documentary 
evidence (PX-1 through PX-48, but excluding PX-19, 24, 45, 46), much of which would 
probably not be admissible under ordinary rules of evidence. (See, e.g.. PX-9 through 11.) 
The Board also allowed Petitioners to submit substantial amount of transcript testimony, which 
all parties recognized would serve as a substitute for testimony before the Board. (Index No. 
IR-163, at 481-488; Index No. IR-164 at 795-796, 857-858, 883-884.) 
It is also reasonable to consider the efficiency with which Petitioners used the time they 
were allotted. For example, Petitioners did not depose Department of Environmental Quality 
employees Tom Ball, Ray Duda, Drew Johnson, or Rick Page. Given this failure, Petitioners 
are not able to proffer testimony for these witnesses and therefore cannot demonstrate that it is 
necessary to examine them before the Board. Similarly, Petitioners did not depose Division 
employee Scott Anderson. For this witness, Petitioners were essentially using hearing time to 
conduct discovery. (Index No. IR-162, at 183 through 192.) In addition, Petitioners spent a 
large amount of time examining the Executive Secretary to demonstrate that he relied on his 
staffs recommendations when he made his determinations. (See, e.g.. Index No. IR-162 at 
48-56.) This examination was unnecessary because that reliance was acknowledged in Mr. 
Downs' prefiled testimony (Index No. IR-138B, paragraphs three through nine), and is not 
legally relevant in any event. 
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The transcript of the hearing below shows that the Board worked to accommodate 
Petitioners' concerns without losing control of the proceeding. Petitioners in this case were 
allowed substantial discovery, were granted a very reasonable amount of time to present their 
case, were allowed to submit substantial documentary evidence, and were allowed to submit 
transcript testimony in lieu of time-consuming live witnesses. Any failure of Petitioners to 
present that case was not due to lack of time, but to decisions made by Petitioners- the 
decision to present the majority of their case through adverse witnesses, the decision not to 
depose a number of those witnesses, and the decision to spend hearing time on a matter that 
was not at issue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm its decision and Order below. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of December, 1997. 
fyM 
aura Lockhart 
Assistant Attorney General 
Raymond Wixom 
Staff Attorney and 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for the Executive Secretary 
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(1) The Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board created by Section 19-1-106 comprises the 
executive director and 12 members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. 
(2) The appointed members shall be knowledgeable about solid and hazardous waste matters 
and consist of: 
(a) one representative of municipal government; 
(b) one representative of county government; 
(c) one representative of the manufacturing or fuel industry; 
(d) one representative of the mining industry; 
(e) one representative of the private solid waste disposal or solid waste recovery industry; 
(f) one registered professional engineer; 
(g) one representative of a local health department; 
(h) one representative of the hazardous waste disposal industry; and 
(i) four representatives of the public, at least one of whom is a representative of 
organized environmental interests. 
19-6-105. 
(1) The board may make rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act: 
(a) establishing minimum standards for protection of human health and the environment, 
for the storage, collection, transport, recovery, treatment, and disposal of solid waste, 
including requirements for the approval of plans for the construction, extension, 
operation, and closure of solid waste disposal sites; 
(e) specifying the terms and conditions under which the board shall approve, disapprove, 
revoke, or review hazardous wastes operation plans; 
UTAH STATUTES, cont. 
19-6-108. 
(9) No proposed nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation plan may be approved 
unless it contains the information that the board requires, including: 
(b) evidence that the disposal of nonhazardous solid waste or treatment, storage, or 
disposal of hazardous waste will not be done in a manner that may cause or 
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality, an increase in serious irreversible 
or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to 
human health or the environment; 
(10) The executive secretary may not approve a commercial nonhazardous solid or hazardous 
waste operation plan that meets the requirements of Subsection (9) unless it contains the 
information required by the board, including: 
(c) compliance history of an owner or operator of a proposed commercial nonhazardous 
solid or hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility, which may be applied 
by the executive secretary in a nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation plan 
decision, including any plan conditions. 
(12) Approval of a nonhazardous solid or hazardous waste operation plan may be revoked, in 
whole or in part, if the person to whom approval of the plan has been given fails to comply 
with that plan. 
UTAH RULES 
R315-3. Application and Plan Approval Procedures for Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, 
and Disposal Facilities. 
R315-3-10. Conditions Applicable to Plan Approvals. The following conditions apply to 
all plan approvals. All conditions applicable to plan approvals shall be incorporated into 
the plan approvals either expressly or by reference. If incorporated by reference, a specific 
citation of these rules shall be given in the plan approval. 
(a) Duty to comply. The permittee shall comply with all conditions of this plan approval, 
except that the permittee need not comply with the conditions of this plan approval to 
the extent and for the duration any noncompliance is authorized in an emergency 
permit. Any plan noncompliance except under the terms of an emergency permit, 
constitutes a violation of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act and is grounds for 
enforcement action; for plan approval termination, revocation and reissuance, or 
modification; or for denial of a plan approval renewal application. 
UTAH RULES, cont. 
R315-3-20. Hazardous Waste Incinerator Plan Approvals. 
(b) For the purpose of determining feasibility of compliance with the performance 
standards of R315-8-15.4, and of determining adequate operating conditions under 
R315-8-15.6, the Executive Secretary shall establish conditions in the plan approval 
to a new hazardous waste incinerator to be effective during the trial burn. 
(5) The Executive Secretary shall approve a trial burn plan if it finds that: 
(i) The trial burn is likely to determine whether the incinerator performance 
standard required by R315-8-15.4 can be met; 
(ii) The trial burn itself will not present an imminent hazard to human health 
or the environment; 
(iii) The trial burn will help the Executive Secretary to determine operating 
requirements to be specified under R315-8-15.6; and 
(iv) The information sought in R315-3-20(b)(5)(i) and (ii) cannot reasonably 
be developed through other means. 
R315-8. Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, 
and Disposal Facilities. 
R315-8-3. Preparedness and Prevention. 
3.1 Applicability. The regulations in this section apply to the owners or operators 
of all hazardous waste management facilities, except as provided otherwise in 
R315-8-1. 
3.2 Design and Operation of Facility. Facilities shall be designed, constructed, 
maintained, and operated to minimize the possibility of a fire, explosion, or any 
unplanned sudden or non-sudden discharge of hazardous waste or hazardous 
waste constituents to air, soil, groundwater, or surface water which could 
threaten the environment or human health. 
Addendum B 
BEFORE THE UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The Tooele Chemical Agent 
Disposal Facility's Permit * ORDER 
and Permit Modifications 
EPAIDNO.UT5210090002 
This matter came before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (the Board) 
for hearing on March 18-20 and April 17,1997 on the First and Second Requests for Agency 
Action by the Petitioners, Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc., Sierra Club and the Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation. Also participating were the Respondents, U.S Department of 
the Army (Army) and EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. (EG&G), and the Executive Secretary. 
The parties were represented by counsel. A quorum of Board members was present and voted on 
the motions resulting in this Order. The hearing was conducted as a formal hearing under the 
authority of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-l et seq. 
(1953, as amended), and Utah Admin. Code R315. 
The Board, having reviewed the record in this matter, and upon consideration of the 
pleadings, evidence and arguments of counsel, voted to deny the First and Second Requests for 
Agency Action, for the reasons on that day orally assigned. The Board hereby issues its written 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Statement of Reasons for Decision, and Order, as required 
by Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-12. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
EQ&Q M Co-Permittee 
1. When the Executive Secretary of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
(Executive Secretary) approved a hazardous waste facility operation plan (plan or permit) for the 
Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) in 1989, he issued the permit to the Tooele 
Army Depot as owner and operator. Since the Army had ultimate responsibility for ownership 
and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary properly determined that EG&G need not 
be included in the permit as a co-permittee. 
2. The Executive Secretary, at his discretion, approved a permit modification on or 
about June 18,1996, adding EG&G, a contractor working for the Army at TOCDF, as co-
permittee. 
Falsification of Temperature Reading 
3. On or about January 9,1997, an employee of TRC Environmental Corporation, a 
subcontractor to EG&G, intentionally recorded false information in connection with a 
temperature reading during a trial bum. The incident was investigated after being discovered by 
a state inspector and EG&G representatives, and the trial bum data for that incident were 
discarded and not used. EG&G ordered its subcontractor to permanently remove the employee 
from TOCDF. TRC agreed and did so. 
Approval of Trial Burn Plans and TOCDF Operations 
4. On June 18,1996 and June 26,1996, respectively, the Executive Secretary approved 
the Deactivation Furnace and Liquid Incinerator Agent Trial Bum Plans. Prior to approval of the 
trial bum plans, the Executive Secretary required the successful completion of surrogate trial 
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bums in both the Deactivation Furnace System (DFS) and the Liquid Incinerator (LIC). The 
plans for these surrogate trial bums were published for a public comment period with public 
meetings scheduled during the comment period. After considering the public comments, the 
Executive Secretary approved the surrogate trial burn plans. The Board finds and concludes that 
the Executive Secretary properly approved the trial bums and TOCDF agent operations for the 
TOCDF facility. 
5. In their Second Request for Agency Action, Petitioners alleged four bases for setting 
aside the Executive Secretary's approval of the trial bum plans. These allegations were that the 
TOCDF: (1) poses an imminent threat to human health and the environment; (2) that it could not 
prevent or minimize releases; (3) that it could not achieve the required Destruction and Removal 
Efficiency (DRE); and (4) that it did not meet emergency preparedness requirements. 
6. Before becoming fully operational. TOCDF has scheduled four trial bums for the 
DFS: (1) a "shakedown bum" with no agent; (2) an "R&D bum" with no agent; (3) a 
"shakedown bum" with agent; and (4) a "demonstration bum" with agent. TOCDF completed 
the first two bums in the DFS prior to August 22,1996. The successful completion of these 
bums formed a strong basis to believe that TOCDF would complete the agent trial bums 
successfully. 
7. Before agent operations, pursuant to a permit (the "R&D Permit") issued by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the federal Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA), TOCDF conducted a trial bum which was intended to test, and ultimately did show, that 
the DFS was capable of incinerating PCBs to the regulatory 99.9999% ("six nines") level. 
8. TOCDF also completed surrogate trial burns (STB) in the Liquid Incinerator #1 
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("LIC-1") and the DFS, and a TSCA research and development test burn in the DFS. The LIC-1 
STB was conducted in June-July, 1995, and the DFS STB was conducted in October, 1995. The 
destruction removal efficiency achieved for each test was in excess of the six-nines required. 
The results of the tests were summarized in reports submitted to the Executive Secretary and the 
Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (DSHW). 
9. The Executive Secretary issued the required approvals to initiate agent shakedown 
operations in preparation for trial burns with GB-filled M55 rockets. This approval included, but 
was not limited to, finalization of the screening risk assessment and approval of the LIC and the 
DFS agent trial burn plans. A letter summarizing approval to start agent shakedown operations 
was signed by the Executive Secretary on June 26,1996. 
10. The Board finds that the facility does not pose an imminent threat to human health 
and the environment, that TOCDF can prevent or minimize releases, that the facility can achieve 
the required DRE, and that it meets emergency preparedness requirements. With proper 
responses to incidents or concerns, appropriate reviews and changes in or temporary suspensions 
of operations, the Army and EG&G have operated the facility in such a way as to minimize the 
release of hazardous waste and to avoid imminent hazards and mitigate any impacts to public 
health. 
Screening Health Risk Assessment 
11. Prior to approving trial burns of chemical agent at TOCDF, DEQ through its 
contractor, A.T. Kearney, performed a Screening Health Risk Assessment (SRA) which analyzed 
the impacts of the expected TOCDF emissions on human health and the environment. The SRA 
followed applicable EPA guidance. 
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12. In keeping with the EPA guidance and current risk assessment practice, the SRA 
used conservative assumptions to determine the resulting risk estimates, including for example: 
(1) DEQ used maximum J A CADS emissions levels, which it increased to account for the greater 
capacity of TOCDF, to model TOCDF air emissions; (2) DEQ assumed that emissions at 
TOCDF would be twice the JACADS detection limits in the cases where compounds were not 
detected; and (3) DEQ calculated the risks from exposure for up to thirty years of TOCDF 
emissions, when in fact, the facility is planned to operate for only about seven years. 
13. The SRA examined the potential exposures to a hypothetical adult and child residing 
at the point of maximum off-site emissions, three different farmers modeled upon site-specific 
data and a subsistence fisherman. Each of these individuals was modeled to live north of 
TOCDF, which is downwind of the facility for 350 days of the year. For each of these six 
individuals, assuming simultaneous and continuous operation of all five furnaces and other 
TOCDF and CAMDS facilities for thirty years, the overall cancer and non-cancer risks were at or 
below EPA risk levels. 
14. With respect to cancer effects of dioxin, the risk assessment used EPA's current 
conservative methodology to calculate overall cancer risks from TOCDF emissions and found 
that the overall cancer risks do not exceed EPA guidance levels for ten, fifteen and thirty-year 
operating periods. The SRA did not include a calculation of non-cancer effects of dioxin 
exposure because EPA had not adopted a reference dose for dioxin. Respondent's expert, Dr. 
Finley, calculated average daily intakes of dioxin for the six risk assessment scenarios used by 
DEQ in the SRA, and testified that these exposures should be below the level of concern for non-
cancer effects. 
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15. Dr. Finley also calculated the cancer and non-cancer risks for a likely one-year trial 
burn period and determined that conservatively estimated risks were orders of magnitude below 
EPA target levels. He also declared that the conservatively estimated doses of dioxin to a breast 
fed infant were below the level of concern. 
16. Respondents' medical expert, Dr. Guzelian, testified that low level environmental 
exposures to dioxin are unlikely to produce adverse human health consequences. EPA's Science 
Advisory Board also has reported that the scientific evidence compiled by EPA does not support 
a conclusion that adverse effects in humans may be occurring near the current exposure levels. 
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that low level exposures to dioxin that may be caused 
by operation of the facility will cause, or are likely to cause, adverse human health effects. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
17. Using an independent contractor, the Army arranged for preparation of both a 
quantitative risk assessment for the first two disposal campaigns and a comprehensive 
quantitative risk assessment for all TOCDF operations, performed using information specific to 
TOCDF, as recommended by the National Research Council. These assessments quantified the 
actual probability of occurrence for events leading to an accidental release of chemical agent and 
evaluated the potential consequences of such releases in terms of fatalities. The analysis, 
completed in December, 1996, confirmed the Army's earlier determination that the risks of 
fatalities associated with storage greatly exceed those associated with TOCDF operations. The 
total risks of accidental fatalities for an assumed 7.1 year period of TOCDF operations are 
equivalent to the risks associated with only thirty-four days of continued storage. With respect to 
individuals living closest to TOCDF, the risks resulting from continued storage are one hundred 
6 
times greater than the risks resulting from disposal operations. 
Revocation/Termination of Plan Approval: Non-Compliance Issues 
18. Petitioners have challenged the Executive Secretary's issuance of the plan approval 
and certain modifications thereto on grounds of the permittees' non-compliance with the law and 
the permit, and with an allegation that the Executive Secretary's actions were unsupported by 
substantial evidence or were arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners did not present evidence that 
either the Army or EG&G has had a poor compliance history on safety and environmental issues 
or has failed to comply with legal or permit requirements in connection with TOCDF. The 
Board finds no evidence sufficient to justify revocation or termination of the Army and EG&G's 
permit on these grounds. 
Revocation/Termination of Plan Approval: Operational Incidents 
19. Petitioners allege that the permit should be revoked or otherwise terminated because 
of certain incidents described in the evidence presented to the Board, namely: agent migration 
into filter vestibules, cracks in a concrete floor, agent migration into an observation corridor, 
facility response to a loss of site electrical power, fire suppression system test and temporary 
HVAC imbalance, agent quantification anomaly, improper hot cut-outs and the question of agent 
emissions in the TOCDF stack effluent gases. The Board finds no evidence sufficient to justify 
revocation or termination of the Army and EG&G's permit on these grounds. 
20. Operations at TOCDF during the shakedown period have proceeded deliberately to 
ensure that full-scale operations will be conducted in a manner that maximizes the protection of 
TOCDF workers, the public and the environment. DSHW has engaged in extensive oversight of 
TOCDF operations. DSHW has an office on the facility, has conducted oversight on almost a 
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daily basis, and has a real-time computer link which transmits data to a computer terminal at 
DSHW's offices in Salt Lake City. 
21. During the shakedown period, three events occurred that caused Respondents to 
immediately shut down operations: detection of low levels of agent in two filter unit containment 
vestibules, leakage of a small quantity of decontamination fluid passing through hairline cracks 
in a second level cement floor to a first floor electrical room, and minor agent migration into an 
observation corridor. Two of the incidents involved trace amounts of chemical agent migrating 
to unintended areas. None resulted in harm to TOCDF personnel, the public or the environment. 
Descriptions of the events and corrective actions taken in response to each event have been 
adequately explained to the Board and the Executive Secretary, and were adequately addressed 
by the Army and EG&G. 
22. With regard to the other incidents described in paragraph 19 above, the Board finds 
that: adequate backup generators are in place at TOCDF, and there has never been an occasion 
when the backup power system failed to operate upon loss of power; the fire suppression system 
test and temporary HVAC imbalance was properly responded to and TOCDF personnel have 
received corrective training; the agent quantification system anomaly has been corrected; hot cut 
out procedures are a normal part of facility operations, and appropriate workers are equipped 
with protective equipment; and stack effluent gases are appropriately monitored by ACAMS and 
DAAMS systems and the agent readings in the ACAMS TREND reports were challenges to the 
monitoring equipment and not releases of agent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND REASONS FOR DECISION 
1. In approving the permit in 1989, the Executive Secretary acted in accordance with 
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applicable rules and statutes, and acted in a manner that was appropriate and timely. The Board 
recognizes that it is not unusual for a hazardous waste facility to have subcontractors or 
contractors participating in operating the facility. The existence of such contractors does not 
necessarily mean that they are "operators" of the facility within the meaning of the Utah Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Act and rules issued thereunder. As the Army had ultimate responsibility 
for ownership and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary properly determined that 
EG&G, a contractor for the Army, need not be included in the permit as a co-permittee. 
2. While not legally required to add the Army's contractor, EG&G, as co-permittee, the 
Executive Secretary acted within his discretion and in accordance with applicable rules and 
statutes, including RCRA section 3005,42 U.S.C section 6925, and the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Act, Utah Code Ann section 19-6-108, and acted in a manner that was 
appropriate and timely, in approving the permit modification adding EG&G as co-permittee in 
1996. The Executive Secretary acted properly and well within his discretion regarding the 
timing and processing of the TOCDF permit given the generalized nature of the applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements. At no time was TOCDF constructed or operated without 
the required permit(s). 
3. The January 9,1997 recording of false information regarding a temperature reading by 
an employee of TRC during a trial bum was discovered by EG&G and DSHW personnel on that 
same day. The temperature readings did not affect the bum itself, but related to the temperature 
needed to preserve a sample. EG&G quality assurance staff immediately recorded the incident 
and commenced preparation of a deficiency report. At that time, EG&G ordered its 
subcontractor to permanently remove the employee from TOCDF. TRC agreed and did so. TRC 
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also indicated that the employee acted alone and took full responsibility for its employee's 
misconduct. TRC agreed to pay for the repeat of the trial burn run, given that the results of the 
January 9 run were discarded. In addition, as further corrective action to avoid any repeat of the 
incident, TRC conducted extensive ethics training for its employees working at TOCDF. 
EG&G's Risk Management Department Director, Tom Kurkjy, testified that the problem has not 
reoccurred. 
4. The Petitioners have failed to provide data or present evidence indicating that the 
Executive Secretary's approval of trial burns was inappropriate or not in accordance with law. 
The Board recognizes the importance of trial burn data relative to understanding any emissions at 
TOCDF and for purposes of approval of full-scale activity at TOCDF once the trial burns are 
completed. The Board finds and concludes that the Executive Secretary and DSHW acted 
properly in approving the trial burns and in the collection of data during the trial burns. 
5. Rule R315-3-20 of the Utah Administrative Code establishes the standard to issue a 
hazardous waste incinerator plan approval (permit). Under the provisions of R315-3-20(b)(5), 
the Executive Secretary shall approve a plan if: (1) the trial burn is likely to determine whether 
the incinerator performance standard can be met; (2) the trial burn itself will not present an 
imminent hazard to human health or the environment; (3) the trial burn will help the Executive 
Secretary determine operating requirements; and the information sought in items (1) and (2) 
cannot reasonably be developed through other means. In their Second Request for Agency 
Action, Petitioners alleged four bases (listed in paragraph 5 above) for setting aside the approval 
of the trial bum plans. The Board concludes that Petitioners have failed to present evidence on 
these issues sufficient to justify revocation, termination or modification of the plans by the 
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Board. 
6. The Board finds and concludes that the Screening Risk Assessment (SRA) was 
performed using applicable EPA guidance and met all requirements for a health risk assessment. 
The SRA indicates that TOCDF can be operated as designed within the risks established by EPA 
for emissions as set forth in the design and construction. With respect to open burning / open 
detonation (OB/OD) activities, the Executive Secretary has prohibited the Army from conducting 
OB/OD until such time as a combined health risk assessment for both TOCDF operations and 
OB/OD is completed and indicates that the combined health risk is within acceptable limits. 
7. The Petitioners failed to present evidence refuting the conclusions of the SRA, and 
the Board finds and concludes that the Executive Secretary acted appropriately in approving 
operations based on information in the SRA. The SRA was not a required study but was done at 
the discretion of the Executive Secretary and the Army because of their concern for human health 
and the environment, and the SRA will continue to be revised in the future as appropriate, for 
example, in the event of OB/OD activities simultaneous with TOCDF incineration operations. 
The risks of continued storage outweigh the risks from TOCDF operations, as outlined in the 
QRA. 
8. The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence supports the Executive 
Secretary's approval of TOCDF's trial burn plans, permit and permit modifications, and denies 
Petitioners' First and Second Requests for Agency Action. 
9. In further support of its decision, the Board hereby incorporates into these 
Conclusions of Law and Reasons for Decision all of the Findings of Fact set forth above, and 
also incorporates by reference the transcript of the Board members* comments and deliberations 
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on this matter on April 17,1997 (Transcript of Hearing, Volume No. 4). 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the relief requested in Petitioners' First and Second Requests for Agency Action 
is hereby denied, and that the TOCDF permits and permit modifications approved by the 
Executive Secretary are upheld and shall remain in effect unless amended, revoked or otherwise 
affected by the Executive Secretary or by further order of the Board. 
DATED this day of July, 1997. 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 
CONTROL BOARD 
By: Richard B. White, Board Chairman 
NOTICE 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-13, any party may request that this Order 
be reconsidered by the Board. Any such request must be in writing, must be filed with the Board 
(with a copy to each party) within twenty days after the date shown on the attached mailing 
certificate, and must state specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals under 
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applicable statutes and court rules, including Utah Code Ann. sections 63-46b-14 and -16 and 
78-2a-3 and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, by the filing of a proper petition within 
thirty days of the date shown on the attached mailing certificate for this Order (or, if applicable, 
within thirty days after a request for reconsideration is denied). 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the . day of July, 1997 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Mick Harrison 
GreenLaw, Suite 7 
200 Short Street 
P. 0. Box 467 
Berea, KY 40403 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Randy Skanchy 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 So. Main Street, Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1644 
Robert Ukeiley 
Ecological Consult, for the Public Interest 
1942 Broadway, Ste 206 
Boulder, CO 80302 
Richard E. Condit 
Greenlaw, Inc. 
1347 Emerald Street 
P.O. Box 1078 
Washington, D. C. 20013-1978 
Craig D. Galli 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Ste 1800 
P. O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Alan D. Greenberg 
Robert H. Foster 
Environmental Defense Section 
U.S. Dept. Of Justice 
999 18th Street, Ste 945 (North Tower) 
Denver, CO 80202 
Captain Michael E. Mulligan 
Gerald P. Kohns 
Department of the Army 
U. S. Army Litigation Center 
901 North Stuart St. Ste 400 
Arlington, VA 22203-1837 
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Richard B. White, Chairman 
Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd. 
EarthFax Engineering, Inc. 
7324 S. Union Park Avenue, Ste 100 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Laura J. Lockhart 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P. O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
Dennis Downs. Executive Secretary 
Utah Solid & Hazard. Waste Board 
288 No. 1460 West 
P. O. Box 144880 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4880 
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Addendum C 
BEFORE THE UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS 
WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The Tooele Chemical Agent 
Disposal Facility's Permit * ORDER 
and Permit Modifications 
EPA ID No. UT5210090002 
This matter came before the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (the Board) 
for hearing on March 18-20 and April 17,1997 on the First and Second Requests for Agency 
Action by the Petitioners, Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc., Sierra Club and the Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation. Also participating were the Respondents, U.S Department of 
the Army (Army) and EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. (EG&G), and the Executive Secretary. 
The parties were represented by counsel. A quorum of Board members was present and voted on 
the motions resulting in this Order. The hearing was conducted as a formal hearing under the 
authority of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-l et seq. 
(1953, as amended), and Utah Admin. Code R315. 
The Board, having reviewed the record in this matter, and upon consideration of the 
pleadings, evidence and arguments of counsel, voted to deny the First and Second Requests for 
Agency Action, for the reasons on that day orally assigned. The Board hereby issues its written 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Statement of Reasons for Decision, and Order, as required 
by Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-12. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
EG&G As Co-Permittee 
1. When the Executive Secretary of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
(Executive Secretary) approved a hazardous waste facility operation plan (plan or permit) for the 
Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (TOCDF) in 1989, he issued the permit to the Tooele 
Army Depot as owner and operator. Since the Army had ultimate responsibility for ownership 
and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary properly determined that EG&G need not 
be included in the permit as a co-permittee. 
2. The Executive Secretary, at his discretion, approved a permit modification on or 
about June 18, 1996, adding EG&G, a contractor working for the Army at TOCDF, as co-
permittee. 
Falsification of Temperature Reading 
3. On or about January 9,1997, an employee of TRC Environmental Corporation, a 
subcontractor to EG&G, intentionally recorded false information in connection with a 
temperature reading during a trial bum. The incident was investigated after being discovered by 
a state inspector and EG&G representatives, and the trial bum data for that incident were 
discarded and not used. EG&G ordered its subcontractor to permanently remove the employee 
from TOCDF. TRC agreed and did so. 
Approval of Trial Burn Plans and TOCDF Operations 
4. On June 18,1996 and June 26,1996, respectively, the Executive Secretary approved 
the Deactivation Furnace and Liquid Incinerator Agent Trial Bum Plans. Prior to approval of the 
trial bum plans, the Executive Secretary required the successful completion of surrogate trial 
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bums in both the Deactivation Furnace System (DFS) and the Liquid Incinerator (LIC). The 
plans for these surrogate trial bums were published for a public comment period with public 
meetings scheduled during the comment period. After considering the public comments, the 
Executive Secretary approved the surrogate trial bum plans. The Board finds and concludes that 
the Executive Secretary properly approved the trial bums and TOCDF agent operations for the 
TOCDF facility. 
5. In their Second Request for Agency Action, Petitioners alleged four bases for setting 
aside the Executive Secretary's approval of the trial bum plans. These allegations were that the 
TOCDF: (1) poses an imminent threat to human health and the environment; (2) that it could not 
prevent or minimize releases; (3) that it could not achieve the required Destruction and Removal 
Efficiency (DRE); and (4) that it did not meet emergency preparedness requirements. 
6. Before becoming fully operational. TOCDF has scheduled four trial bums for the 
DFS: (1) a "shakedown bum" with no agent; (2) an "R&D bum" with no agent; (3) a 
"shakedown bum" with agent; and (4) a "demonstration bum" with agent. TOCDF completed 
the first two bums in the DFS prior to August 22,1996. The successful completion of these 
bums formed a strong basis to believe that TOCDF would complete the agent trial bums 
successfully. 
7. Before agent operations, pursuant to a permit (the "R&D Permit") issued by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the federal Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA), TOCDF .conducted a trial bum which was intended to test, and ultimately did show, that 
the DFS was capable of incinerating PCBs to the regulatory 99.9999% ("six nines") level 
8. TOCDF also completed surrogate trial burns (STB) in the Liquid Incinerator #1 
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("LIC-1") and the DFS, and a TSCA research and development test bum in the DFS. The L1C-1 
STB was conducted in June-July, 1995, and the DFS STB was conducted in October, 1995. The 
destruction removal efficiency achieved for each test was in excess of the six-nines required. 
The results of the tests were summarized in reports submitted to the Executive Secretary and the 
Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (DSHW). 
9. The Executive Secretary issued the required approvals to initiate agent shakedown 
operations in preparation for trial bums with GB-filled M55 rockets. This approval included, but 
was not limited to, finalization of the screening risk assessment and approval of the LIC and the 
DFS agent trial bum plans. A letter summarizing approval to start agent shakedown operations 
was signed by the Executive Secretary on June 26,1996. 
10. The Board finds that the facility does not pose an imminent threat to human health 
and the environment, that TOCDF can prevent or minimize releases, that the facility can achieve 
the required DRE, and that it meets emergency preparedness requirements. With proper 
responses to incidents or concerns, appropriate reviews and changes in or temporary suspensions 
of operations, the Army and EG&G have operated the facility in such a way as to minimize the 
release of hazardous waste and to avoid imminent hazards and mitigate any impacts to public 
health. 
Screening Health Risk Assessment 
11. Prior to approving trial burns of chemical agent at TOCDF, DEQ through its 
contractor, A.T. Kearney, performed a Screening Health Risk Assessment (SRA) which analyzed 
the impacts of the expected TOCDF emissions on human health and the environment. The SRA 
followed applicable EPA guidance. 
4 
12. In keeping with the EPA guidance and current risk assessment practice, the SRA 
used conservative assumptions to determine the resulting risk estimates, including for example: 
(1) DEQ used maximum J AC ADS emissions levels, which it increased to account for the greater 
capacity of TOCDF, to model TOCDF air emissions; (2) DEQ assumed that emissions at 
TOCDF would be twice the JACADS detection limits in the cases where compounds were not 
detected; and (3) DEQ calculated the risks from exposure for up to thirty years of TOCDF 
emissions, when in fact, the facility is planned to operate for only about seven years. 
13. The SRA examined the potential exposures to a hypothetical adult and child residing 
at the point of maximum off-site emissions, three different farmers modeled upon site-specific 
data and a subsistence fisherman. Each of these individuals was modeled to live north of 
TOCDF, which is downwind of the facility for 350 days of the year. For each of these six 
individuals, assuming simultaneous and continuous operation of all five furnaces and other 
TOCDF and CAMDS facilities for thirty years, the overall cancer and non-cancer risks were at or 
below EPA risk levels. 
14. With respect to cancer effects of dioxin, the risk assessment used EPA's current 
conservative methodology to calculate overall cancer risks from TOCDF emissions and found 
that the overall cancer risks do not exceed EPA guidance levels for ten, fifteen and thirty-year 
operating periods. The SRA did not include a calculation of non-cancer effects of dioxin 
exposure because EPA had not adopted a reference dose for dioxin. Respondent's expert, Dr. 
Finley, calculated average daily intakes of dioxin for the six risk assessment scenarios used by 
DEQ in the SRA, and testified that these exposures should be below the level of concern for non-
cancer effects. 
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15. Dr. Finley also calculated the cancer and non-cancer risks for a likely one-year trial 
burn period and determined that conservatively estimated risks were orders of magnitude below 
EPA target levels. He also declared that the conservatively estimated doses of dioxin to a breast 
fed infant were below the level of concern. 
16. Respondents' medical expert, Dr. Guzelian, testified that low level environmental 
exposures to dioxin are unlikely to produce adverse human health consequences. EPA's Science 
Advisory Board also has reported that the scientific evidence compiled by EPA does not support 
a conclusion that adverse effects in humans may be occurring near the current exposure levels. 
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that low level exposures to dioxin that may be caused 
by operation of the facility will cause, or are likely to cause, adverse human health effects. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
17. Using an independent contractor, the Army arranged for preparation of both a 
quantitative risk assessment for the first two disposal campaigns and a comprehensive 
quantitative risk assessment for all TOCDF operations, performed using information specific to 
TOCDF, as recommended by the National Research Council. These assessments quantified the 
actual probability of occurrence for events leading to an accidental release of chemical agent and 
evaluated the potential consequences of such releases in terms of fatalities. The analysis, 
completed in December, 1996, confirmed the Army's earlier determination that the risks of 
fatalities associated with storage greatly exceed those associated with TOCDF operations. The 
total risks of accidental fatalities for an assumed 7.1 year period of TOCDF operations are 
equivalent to the risks associated with only thirty-four days of continued storage. With respect to 
individuals living closest to TOCDF, the risks resulting from continued storage are one hundred 
6 
times greater than the risks resulting from disposal operations. 
Revocation/Termination of Plan Approval: Non-Compliance Issues 
18. Petitioners have challenged the Executive Secretary's issuance of the plan approval 
and certain modifications thereto on grounds of the permittees' non-compliance with the law and 
the permit, and with an allegation that the Executive Secretary's actions were unsupported by 
substantial evidence or were arbitrary and capricious. Petitioners did not present evidence that 
either the Army or EG&G has had a poor compliance history on safety and environmental issues 
or has failed to comply with legal or permit requirements in connection with TOCDF. The 
Board finds no evidence sufficient to justify revocation or termination of the Army and EG&G's 
permit on these grounds. 
RgvQgatiQn/TgrrpinatiQn of Pfcn Apprpvpl; QpgrgtiPPgl focidfflts 
19. Petitioners allege that the permit should be revoked or otherwise terminated because 
of certain incidents described in the evidence presented to the Board, namely: agent migration 
into filter vestibules, cracks in a concrete floor, agent migration into an observation corridor, 
facility response to a loss of site electrical power, fire suppression system test and temporary 
HVAC imbalance, agent quantification anomaly, improper hot cut-outs and the question of agent 
emissions in the TOCDF stack effluent gases. The Board finds no evidence sufficient to justify 
revocation or termination of the Army and EG&G's permit on these grounds. 
20. Operations at TOCDF during the shakedown period have proceeded deliberately to 
ensure that full-scale operations will be conducted in a manner that maximizes the protection of 
TOCDF workers, the public and the environment. DSHW has engaged in extensive oversight of 
TOCDF operations. DSHW has an office on the facility, has conducted oversight on almost a 
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daily basis, and has a real-time computer link which transmits data to a computer terminal at 
DSHW's offices in Salt Lake City. 
21. During the shakedown period, three events occurred that caused Respondents to 
immediately shut down operations: detection of low levels of agent in two filter unit containment 
vestibules, leakage of a small quantity of decontamination fluid passing through hairline cracks 
in a second level cement floor to a first floor electrical room, and minor agent migration into an 
observation corridor. Two of the incidents involved trace amounts of chemical agent migrating 
to unintended areas. None resulted in harm to TOCDF personnel, the public or the environment. 
Descriptions of the events and corrective actions taken in response to each event have been 
adequately explained to the Board and the Executive Secretary, and were adequately addressed 
by the Army and EG&G. 
22. With regard to the other incidents described in paragraph 19 above, the Board finds 
that: adequate backup generators are in place at TOCDF, and there has never been an occasion 
when the backup power system failed to operate upon loss of power; the fire suppression system 
test and temporary' HVAC imbalance was properly responded to and TOCDF personnel have 
received corrective training; the agent quantification system anomaly has been corrected; hot cut 
out procedures are a normal part of facility operations, and appropriate workers are equipped 
with protective equipment; and stack effluent gases are appropriately monitored by ACAMS and 
DAAMS systems and the agent readings in the ACAMS TREND reports were challenges to the 
monitoring equipment and not releases of agent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND REASONS FOR DECISION 
1. In approving the permit in 1989, the Executive Secretary acted in accordance with 
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applicable rules and statutes, and acted in a manner that was appropriate and timely. The Board 
recognizes that it is not unusual for a hazardous waste facility to have subcontractors or 
contractors participating in operating the facility. The existence of such contractors does not 
necessarily mean that they are "operators" of the facility within the meaning of the Utah Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Act and rules issued thereunder. As the Army had ultimate responsibility 
for ownership and operation of the facility, the Executive Secretary properly determined that 
EG&G, a contractor for the Army, need not be included in the permit as a co-permittee. 
2. While not legally required to add the Army's contractor, EG&G, as co-permittee, the 
Executive Secretary acted within his discretion and in accordance with applicable rules and 
statutes, including RCRA section 3005,42 U.S.C. section 6925, and the Utah Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Act, Utah Code Ann section 19-6-108, and acted in a manner that was 
appropriate and timely, in approving the permit modification adding EG&G as co-permittee in 
1996. The Executive Secretary acted properly and well within his discretion regarding the 
timing and processing of the TOCDF permit given the generalized nature of the applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements. At no time was TOCDF constructed or operated without 
the required permit(s). 
3. The January 9,1997 recording of false information regarding a temperature reading by 
an employee of TRC during a trial bum was discovered by EG&G and DSHW personnel on that 
same day. The temperature readings did not affect the bum itself, but related to the temperature 
needed to preserve a sample. EG&G quality assurance staff immediately recorded the incident 
and commenced preparation of a deficiency report. At that time, EG&G ordered its 
subcontractor to permanently remove the employee from TOCDF. TRC agreed and did so. TRC 
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also indicated that the employee acted alone and took full responsibility for its employee's 
misconduct. TRC agreed to pay for the repeat of the trial burn run, given that the results of the 
January 9 run were discarded. In addition, as further corrective action to avoid any repeat of the 
incident, TRC conducted extensive ethics training for its employees working at TOCDF. 
EG&G's Risk Management Department Director, Tom Kurkjy, testified that the problem has not 
reoccurred. 
4. The Petitioners have failed to provide data or present evidence indicating that the 
Executive Secretary's approval of trial burns was inappropriate or not in accordance with law. 
The Board recognizes the importance of trial burn data relative to understanding any emissions at 
TOCDF and for purposes of approval of full-scale activity at TOCDF once the trial burns are 
completed. The Board finds and concludes that the Executive Secretary and DSHW acted 
properly in approving the trial burns and in the collection of data during the trial burns. 
5. Rule R315-3-20 of the Utah Administrative Code establishes the standard to issue a 
hazardous waste incinerator plan approval (permit). Under the provisions of R315-3-20(b)(5), 
the Executive Secretary shall approve a plan if: (1) the trial burn is likely to determine whether 
the incinerator performance standard can be met; (2) the trial burn itself will not present an 
imminent hazard to human health or the environment; (3) the trial burn will help the Executive 
Secretary determine operating requirements; and the information sought in items (1) and (2) 
cannot reasonably be developed through other means. In their Second Request for Agency 
Action, Petitioners alleged four bases (listed in paragraph 5 above) for setting aside the approval 
of the trial burn plans. The Board concludes that Petitioners have failed to present evidence on 
these issues sufficient to justify revocation, termination or modification of the plans by the 
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Board. 
6. The Board finds and concludes that the Screening Risk Assessment (SRA) was 
performed using applicable EPA guidance and met all requirements for a health risk assessment. 
The SRA indicates that TOCDF can be operated as designed within the risks established by EPA 
for emissions as set forth in the design and construction. With respect to open burning / open 
detonation (OB/OD) activities, the Executive Secretary has prohibited the Army from conductmg 
OB/OD until such time as a combined health risk assessment for both TOCDF operations and 
OB/OD is completed and indicates that the combined health risk is within acceptable limits. 
7. The Petitioners failed to present evidence refuting the conclusions of the SRA, and 
the Board finds and concludes that the Executive Secretary acted appropriately in approving 
operations based on information in the SRA. The SRA was not a required study but was done at 
the discretion of the Executive Secretary and the Army because of their concern for human health 
and the environment, and the SRA will continue to be revised in the future as appropriate, for 
example, in the event of OB/OD activities simultaneous with TOCDF incineration operations. 
The risks of continued storage outweigh the risks from TOCDF operations, as outlined in the 
QRA. 
8. The Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence supports the Executive 
Secretary's approval of TOCDF's trial bum plans, permit and permit modifications, and uenies 
Petitioners' First and Second Requests for Agency Action. 
9. In further support of its decision, the Board hereby incorporates into these 
Conclusions of Law and Reasons for Decision all of the Findings of Fact set forth above, and 
also incorporates by reference the transcript of the Board members* comments and deliberations 
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on this matter on April 17,1997 (Transcript of Hearing, Volume No. 4). 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the relief requested in Petitioners' First and Second Requests for Agency Action 
is hereby denied, and that the TOCDF permits and permit modifications approved by the 
Executive Secretary are upheld and shall remain in efifect unless amended, revoked or otherwise 
affected by the Executive Secretary or by further order of the Board. 
DATED this day of July, 1997. 
UTAH SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 
CONTROL BOARD 
By: Richard B. White, Board Chairman 
NOTICE 
Under Utah Code Ann. section 63-46b-13, any party may request that this Order 
be reconsidered by the Board. Any such request must be in writing, must be filed with the Board 
(with a copy to each party) within twenty days after the date shown on the attached mailing 
certificate, and must state specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals under 
12 
applicable statutes and court rules, including Utah Code Ann. sections 63-46M4 and -16 and 
78-2a-3 and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, by the filing of a proper petition within 
thirty days of the date shown on the attached mailing certificate for this Order (or, if applicable, 
within thirty days after a request for reconsideration is denied). 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the . day of July, 1997 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Mick Harrison 
GreenLaw, Suite 7 
200 Short Street 
P. O. Box 467 
Berea, KY 40403 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Randy Skanchy 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 So. Main Street, Ste 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1644 
Robert Ukeiley 
Ecological Consult, for the Public Interest 
1942 Broadway, Ste 206 
Boulder, CO 80302 
Richard E. Condit 
Greenlaw, Inc. 
1347 Emerald Street 
P.O. Box 1078 
Washington, D. C. 20013-1978 
Craig D. Galli 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Ste 1800 
P. O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Alan D. Greenberg 
Robert H. Foster 
Environmental Defense Section 
U.S. Dept. Of Justice 
999 18th Street, Ste 945 (North Tower) 
Denver, CO 80202 
Captain Michael E. Mulligan 
Gerald P. Kohns 
Department of the Army 
U. S. Army Litigation Center 
901 North Stuart St. Ste 400 
Arlington, VA 22203-1837 
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Richard B. White, Chairman 
Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd. 
EarthFax Engineering, Inc. 
7324 S. Union Park Avenue, Ste 100 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Laura J. Lockhart 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P. O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
Dennis Downs, Executive Secretary 
Utah Solid & Hazard. Waste Board 
288 No. 1460 West 
P. O. Box 144880 




Mick G. Harr ison , Esq. AM ~ _ , ?$ 
D i r e c t o r , GreenLaw, I n c . 7|8|9ii0fili!2/ii2^i'±i£ro 
505 N. Walnut ^ Q\o. 03\\\ 
Bloomington, IN 47404 
(812) 339-2605 (vo ice ) 
Counsel for CWWG, WAF, and Sierra Club 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEFORE THE SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL BOARD 
DIVISION OF SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
THE TOOELE CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL 
FACILITY'S PERMIT AND PERMIT MODIFICATIONS 
EPA I.D. No. UT5210090002 
CASE No. (PENDING) 
SECOND REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION AND/OR 
PETITION TO INTERVENE SOUGHT BY THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
WORKING GROUP, SIERRA CLUB, AND VIETNAM 
VETERANS OF AMERICA FOUNDATION 
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Code (UAC) §§ R315-12-3; 
R315-12-4; R315-12-5, and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) §§ 63-46b-3; 63-46b-9; 63-46b-12, the Chemical Weapons 
Working Group, Inc. (CWWG), Sierra Club, and Vietnam Veterans of 
America Foundation (WAF) request that the Utah Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Control Board (Board or Agency) take action to reverse the 
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decision of the Utah Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste (DSHW) 
which approved chemical weapons destruction activities at the U.S. 
Army's chemical weapons incinerator in Tooele County, Utah. The 
factual and legal bases for the this request are outlined below. 
I. PARTIES 
CWWG is a non-profit environmental and citizens organization 
incorporated in the State of Kentucky. CWWG is dedicated to 
protecting public health and the environment in the communities 
around the sites proposed by the Army and Department of Defense 
(DOD) for disposal of the chemical weapons stockpile, as well as 
throughout the world. CWWG's members reside, work and recreate in 
the communities around the Army, DOD and EG&G Defense Materials, 
Inc.'s (EG&G) chemical weapons incineration facility in Tooele 
County, Utah, the Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility 
(TOCDF), and in proximity to the water bodies and food sources 
which will be impacted by toxic emissions from the TOCDF. CWWG's 
members are and will be adversely affected by the Respondents1 
incineration of nerve agent, blister agent and other hazardous and 
toxic wastes at the TOCDF as a result of toxic emissions including 
highly toxic and environmentally persistent dioxin, dioxin-like 
compounds, nerve agents and blister agents. The emission of these 
highly toxic compounds will, as developed more fully infra, poison 
the air, water, soil and food sources on which the members of CWWG 
depend, and which directly and indirectly affect their health, 
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property, recreational, aesthetic and environmental interests. 
Sierra Club is a national non-profit environmental 
organization that is dedicated to protecting public health and the 
environment. The Sierra Club has an Utah chapter and a Salt Lake 
City group. The Sierra Club has members who reside, work and 
recreate in the communities around the Army, DOD and EG&Gfs 
chemical weapons incineration facility in Tooele County, Utah, and 
in proximity to the water bodies and food sources which will be 
impacted by toxic emissions from the facility. Sierra Club also 
derives income from arranging nature outings in Utah. Sierra 
Club's members are and will be adversely affected by the 
Respondents' incineration of nerve agent, blister agent and other 
hazardous and toxic wastes at the TOCDF as a result of toxic 
emissions including highly toxic and environmentally persistent 
dioxin, dioxin-like compounds, nerve agents and blister agents. 
The emission of these highly toxic compounds will, as developed 
more fully infra, poison the air, water, soil and food sources on 
which the members of Sierra Club depend, and which directly and 
indirectly affect their health, property, recreational, aesthetic 
and environmental interests. Members of Sierra club also conduct 
business, recreational, educational, inspirational, and scientific 
activities in the vicinity of the TOCDF, including fishing in the 
water bodies affected thereby, on a regular and continuing basis. 
Members of the Sierra Club also consume fish which comes from the 
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numerous bodies of water affected by the TOCDF. In addition to 
these uses, some of Sierra Club's members obtain their drinking 
water from sources which are hydrologically connected to waters 
into which TOCDF will discharge chemical warfare agents. 
WAF is a national non-profit organization dedicated to 
protecting the interests of Vietnam Veterans. Vietnam veterans 
reside, work and recreate in the communities around the various 
sites proposed by the Army and DOD for disposal of chemical 
weapons. Many of these veterans have been exposed to the ultra 
toxic chemical dioxin as a contaminant in the herbicide/defoliant 
agent orange which was extensively sprayed by the military in 
Vietnam. The EPA has recently issued a report based on a multi-
year study of dioxin exposure and has concluded that the average 
resident of the United States is already overexposed to dioxin as 
a result of existing and past dioxin emission sources, and that the 
current average exposure to dioxin is 10-100 times higher than a 
safe dose. This report confirms that this high national dioxin 
exposure has resulted primarily from the atmospheric transport of 
dioxin air emissions from numerous sources, primarily incinerators 
which have caused nationwide dioxin contamination even in areas 
where no incinerators or other dioxin sources are located. The 
Vietnam veterans unfortunately are likely to have an even higher 
total exposure than the average because of their additional 
exposure in Vietnam. The Army, DOD, and EG&G chemical weapons 
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incineration facility in Tooele County, Utah will be a significant 
additional source of dioxin emissions that will add to an already 
unacceptable dioxin exposure nationally, which additional dioxin 
exposure is likely to cause harm to Vietnam veterans. 
The likely respondents include the United States Department of 
the Army (Army) and Department of Defense (DOD), agencies of the 
United States, are the owners of the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal 
Facility (TOCDF), including the incineration components thereof. 
The Army and DOD are responsible for the incineration trial burn 
and "production burn" for chemical weapons components including 
ultra toxic nerve and blister agents. 
In addition, EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. (EG&G) is the 
operator of the TOCDF incineration facility which Petitioners 
allege herein is in violation of state law and poses an imminent 
hazard to public health and the environment. 
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION 
Petitioners originally filed a compliant in federal court 
challenging the operation of TOCDF because it will pose an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to public health and the environment 
due to the planned and accidental releases of dangerous chemicals 
including: nerve agents, blister agents, metals, polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), dioxins, and other dioxin-like chemicals. On 
July 1, 1996, Federal District Judge Tena Campbell ruled that the 
Federal Court would abstain from ruling on Petitioners1 imminent 
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and substantial endangerment claims as well as other claims because 
to do so would "interfere with Utah's policies and ... [Utah's 
regulatory] scheme and would be disruptive of Utah's attempt to 
ensure uniformity in its hazardous waste policy." CWWG, et al. v. 
United States, Civil No. 2:96-CV-425C (July 1, 1996 transcript at 
4 - 5) . This ruling requires Petitioners to bring their claims to 
the Board for hearing and resolution. 
Jurisdiction and authority for Petitioners' Second Request for 
Action (RFA) / Intervention is governed by the Utah Solid & 
Hazardous Waste Act (SHWA) § 19-6-104; UAC §§ R315-12-3; R315-12-4; 
R315-12-5, and the UAPA §§ 63-46b-3; 63-46b-9, and 63-46b-12. 
III. FACTS AND REASONS FOR THE REQUESTED ACTION 
On June 26, 1996, Dennis Downs (Director DSHW) and Carol Sisco 
(DEQ Public Information) issued a notice announcing that 
"[c]hemical weapons destruction activities are ready to begin at 
the U.S. Army's incinerator located about 50 miles southwest of 
Salt Lake City in Tooele County.1, Public Information 
memo at 1 and Letter from Downs to Coughlin and Thomas dated June 
26, 1996 Re: Agent Trial Burn Approvals. The issued announcement 
concluded that "[i]ncineration approval came after the ... [DSHW] 
determined the Army had met all conditions imposed as part of a 
permit issued in 1989. Approval was granted following state 
certification of the emergency response procedure, final analysis 
of the health risk assessment and review of the incinerators." 
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Memo at 2. Petitioners seek reversal by the Board of these 
approvals. 
Similarly, on July 1, 1996 the DSHW also announced approval of 
1) a Class 2 permit modification approving the deactivation furnace 
system (DFS) agent trial burn plan, 2) a class 2 permit 
modification approving the liquid incinerator #1 (LIC1) agent trial 
plan, and 3) approval of the health risk assessment. Petitioners 
likewise seek reversal of these approvals. 
In further support of Petitioners challenge to the above-
listed approvals and the imminent and substantial endangerment 
posed by trial burn and/or post trial burn operations at TOCDF 
Petitioners provide the following bases in support of their RFA / 
Intervention. 
1. There is no dispute that the world's store of obsolete 
chemical weapons must be destroyed. The potential for military 
use of these weapons must be eliminated. However, the issue is not 
whether such demilitarization and detoxification should be done, 
but how to do it safely. 
2. The Army, DOD and EG&G are currently preparing to 
incinerate nerve and blister agents at the TOCDF incineration 
facility. TOCDF involves five incineration or thermal treatment 
units: 
a) Two Liquid Incinerators (LICs): The LICs include a primary 
and a secondary combustion chamber and are designed to burn nerve 
agents — GB, VX and mustard — as well as liquid laboratory waste 
and spent decontamination liquid. The two LICs are virtually 
identical; 
b) The Deactivation Furnace System (DFS): The rocket pieces, 
PCB containing rocket firing/shipping tubes, explosives and 
propellants are fed into the DFS which includes a rotary kiln and 
afterburner (after leaving the DFS, the rocket pieces are placed on 
a heated discharge conveyor (HDC) for further decontamination); 
c) The Dunnage Incinerator (DUN): The DUN is designed to burn 
both non-contaminated and contaminated dunnage from the munitions 
processing operations — wooden rocket pallets and mortar shipping 
boxes, charcoal and filter media, used protective suits, and 
demister candle filter media; 
d) The Metal Parts Furnace (MPF): The MPF is designed to heat 
metal parts, including ton containers, bombs, spray tanks, and 
artillery projectiles and their burster wells, after most of the 
agent has been drained and explosives removed, to 1000 degrees 
Fahrenheit and maintain that temperature for 15 minutes to vaporize 
remaining agent contamination which is discharged as a gas and 
passed through an afterburner. 
3. The five incinerators exhaust their combustion gases into 
a stack. The stack discharges combustion gases, including chemical 
warfare agent into the environment. 
4. The TOCDF incinerators and combustion units are not closed 
168/03.1 8 
loop systems. Notwithstanding pollution control systems, these 
TOCDF combustion units emits large volumes of combustion gases as 
well as fugitive emissions into the environment. These combustion 
gases and fugitive emissions that are released to the environment 
contain a variety of highly toxic compounds including unburned 
chemical warfare agents as well as dioxin and dioxin-like compounds 
which are among the most, if not the most, toxic chemical compounds 
yet discovered. 
5. The building in which the incinerators are housed contains 
a heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system. The HVAC 
system is designed to filter any chemical agent that escapes the 
processing equipment or incinerators and enters the building. 
However, the HVAC is not efficient enough to prevent all of the 
escaped agent from leaving the building by being discharged out the 
HVAC stack and into the outside environment. 
6. The brine reduction area (BRA) is designed to cool the 
brine from the pollution abatement system (PAS). In processing 
brine, gases as discharged out the BRA stack and into the 
environment. The gases that are discharged out the BRA stack may 
include chemical agent. 
7. The Army and EG&G have submitted to the Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) Surrogate Trial Burn Reports for the 
LIC 1 and DFS incinerators. The Surrogate is a chemical that is 
burned in the incinerator to predict how the incinerator will 
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perform when it is burning chemical warfare agent. The Surrogate 
is suppose to be more difficult to burn than the chemical warfare 
agent. 
8. The Surrogate Trial Burns evidence that when chemical 
warfare agent is burned in the LIC 1 and DFS, some chemical warfare 
agent will be released out the stack and into the ambient air. 
9. The site specific TOCDF Risk Assessment also gives an 
estimate of the emissions rate of chemical warfare agents out of 
the stack. 
10. The underlying premise of the Army's 1982 decision to use 
incineration for the disposal of nerve agents and the 
detoxification of other residuals from demilitarization of 
chemical weapons was, in large part, the then-common assumption 
that hazardous waste incineration was a well-defined, mature 
technology. A mature technology is a technology that is 
productive, safe for workers and protective of human and 
environmental health. At the time of the Army's decision, there 
was an obvious dearth of documentation on incinerator performance, 
safety and impacts. 
11 . However, as noted infra, since the 1982-85 period when 
the Army selected incineration as the method for 
detoxification/disposal of the components of demilitarized chemical 
weapons and EPA issued the original RCRA permit for JACADS, the 
prototype experimental facility in the Pacific, numerous studies 
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and reports have been published, describing various limitations of 
incinerator performance and environmental impacts. This technology 
was, and still is, practiced and promoted not because it is a 
proven, mature technology, but because it is expeditious and 
liability-free for the generators of the materials incinerated 
(i.e., the pollutants emitted from incinerator stacks and those 
deposited in the ashes and residues of pollution control systems 
cannot be easily traced back to the generators of the waste). 
12. The Petitioners have attempted to convince the Respondents 
to abandon their longstanding commitment to incineration technology 
for disposal of chemical weapons and to adopt a safer alternative 
method. These efforts have been intensified in the last two years 
with the release of the EPA Dioxin Reassessment reports in 
September, 1994, which clearly documented the already unacceptable 
health risks posed by existing incineration facilities nationwide, 
and with the emergence of several additional alternative 
technologies that have obvious advantages to incineration in terms 
of the ability to safely treat nerve and blister agents. 
13. Petitioners have made comments at various points in the 
administrative processes relating to permitting and risk assessment 
for the TOCDF, expressing various technical objections to the 
project as not being in compliance with applicable law and posing 
an unacceptable risk to public health and the environment. Most of 
those concerns remain unaddressed either by the Respondents or the 
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federal and state permitting agencies. Petitioners have been 
instrumental in bringing, and continue to bring, to public 
attention new and disturbing information from former employees at 
the TOCDF and the prototype JACADS facility regarding threats to 
public safety and violations of law at the TOCDF. The Respondents 
have not addressed this evidence and these allegations by 
Petitioners in a timely or responsible manner, and the violations 
of law and threats to public health and the environment continue. 
14. Unless the relief that Petitioners pray for herein is 
granted, the health, property, recreational and other interests of 
Petitioners will be adversely affected and irreparably harmed by 
the Respondents1 illegal discharge of ultra toxic chemical poisons 
including the chemical warfare agents GB, VX, and HD, as well as 
the ultra toxic chemical poison dioxin and dioxin-like compounds. 
While the public interest is served by the responsible destruction 
of chemical weapons in a manner that complies with applicable laws 
that protect public health and the environment, the public interest 
is not served by the Respondents1 reckless rush to destroy the 
chemical weapons stockpile in such a dangerous manner that defeats 
the purpose of the Congressional mandate under which the Army and 
DOD act, and violates the several federal and state laws that 
govern the Respondents' actions. As Congress has made crystal 
clear in 1992 in passing the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961, the federal agencies, including the 
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Army and DOD, are not placed above the state environmental laws. To 
the contrary, the Army and DOD must comply to the letter with all 
substantive and procedural provisions of all state and local 
environmental protection laws. 42 U.S.C. § 6961. 
TOCDF POSES AN IMMINENT AND SUBSTANTIAL ENDANGERMENT TO 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
15. Respondents1 incineration of nerve agent, blister agent, 
and other hazardous and toxic wastes at the TOCDF results in the 
discharge of substantial amounts of toxic chemicals including the 
ultra toxic chemical poison dioxin, nerve agents GB and VX and 
blister agents as a result of both the incomplete destruction (by 
incineration) of the chemical agents in the wastes as well as the 
actual creation of dioxin and dioxin-like compounds as a product of 
the combustion process. 
16. Dioxin is a shorthand term Tor a whole family of chemicals 
(including furans) with similar chemical structures and health and 
environmental impacts. The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency has found dioxin to be extremely toxic and carcinogenic even 
at low doses. The type of dioxin considered by EPA to be the mos*~ 
toxic and carcinogenic is 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxin 
(2,3,7,8-TCDD). The numbers 2,3,7, and 8 represent the position of 
chlorine atoms around the benzene rings that make up the chemical 
structure of dioxin. 
17. In performing health assessments where dioxin is involved, 
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the potencies of each member of the family of dioxins and the 
sister chemical furans that are being emitted from an incinerator 
are often expressed as toxic equivalents of 2,3,7,8 - TCDD. In 
this system TCDD as the most potent form of dioxin receives a toxic 
potency value of one (1), and the other dioxins1 toxic potencies 
are expressed in relation to it as .5, .1, and the like. The 
toxicity of a mixture of various types of dioxins and furans can be 
expressed in terms of the equivalent toxic units of 2,3,7,8-TCDD by 
multiplying the quantity of each type of dioxin by its toxic 
equivalency factor and summing the results. The phrase toxic 
equivalents is typically referred to as TEQs. 
18. The chemicals in the dioxin family are persistent in the 
environment and can accumulate in soil, and bioaccumulate and 
biomagnify in the food chain via plants and animals, eventually 
reaching humans. It takes seven years to a lifetime, depending on 
the individual, for humans to eliminate half of the dioxin they 
ingest from their bodies. It can take as long as ten years or more 
for half the dioxin present in soil to break down. 
19. Based on EPA data on dioxin emissions from hazardous waste 
incinerators and EPAfs latest Dioxin Reassessment report (EPA, 
September 1994) which reports research and analysis on the levels 
of toxicity and carcinogenicity of dioxin, taken together with the 
Army and Utah DEQ risk assessments for TOCDF, the TOCDF 
incinerators are expected to emit more than a million toxic doses 
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of dioxin. Dioxin is the most powerful chemical poison discovered 
to date. It thus becomes a critical question as to the extent to 
which such massive amounts of emitted poison will ultimately be 
captured in the food chain, inhaled, or otherwise result in human 
exposure. The extent of harm to public health will depend on the 
answer to this question. 
20. The Army and the Utah Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ), in the Risk Assessments for the TOCDF incinerators, failed 
to properly take into account the existing high dioxin exposure 
from existing sources nationally and in the Salt Lake area in the 
assessment and calculation of risk from dioxin emissions from the 
TOCDF incinerators. This is a critical error because the 
occurrence of non-cancer adverse health effects from dioxin 
exposure is thought by EPA to be a threshold phenomenon. That is, 
harm from dioxin exposure other than cancer is thought to not occur 
if the total dose to which a person is exposed is lower than a 
certain threshold dose. This threshold dose, which has not been 
specifically identified with any certainty by EPA or any agency or 
scientist to date, has been conservatively estimated for purposes 
of agency public health and environmental protection decision-
making via calculation of a reference dose (RfD) (a virtually safe 
dose). 
21. The critical nature of this risk assessment error by 
Respondents is clear when considered in light of the EPAfs 1994 
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Dioxin Reassessment findings that national exposure to dioxin from 
existing sources is already one to two orders of magnitude (10-100 
times) greater than any virtually safe dose or RfD EPA might 
calculate for dioxin. See EPA 1994 Health Assessment for Dioxin, 
Vol. Ill, p. 9-82 to 9-86. 
22. The 1994 EPA Dioxin Health Assessment reports clearly 
identify the dangers posed by exposure to dioxin and dioxin-like 
chemicals. A few of the key additional conclusions reached by EPA 
regarding dioxin are: 
• Chlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (CDDs) and related 
compounds (collectively commonly known simply as dioxins) 
are contaminants present in a variety of environmental 
media. This class of compounds has caused great concern 
in the general public as well as intense interest in the 
scientific community. Much of the public concern 
revolves around the characterization of these compounds 
as among the most potent "man-made" toxicants ever 
studied. Indeed, these compounds are extremely potent in 
producing a variety of effects in experimental animals 
based on traditional toxico1ogy studies at levels 
hundreds or thousands of times lower than most chemicals 
of environmental interest.1 
• There are 75 individual compounds comprising the CDDs 
[chlorinated dioxins], depending on the positioning of 
the chlorine(s), and 135 different CDFs [chlorinated 
furans]. These are called individual congeners. 
Likewise, there are 75 different positional congeners of 
BDDs [brominated dioxins] and 135 different congeners of 
BDFs [brominated furans] ... There are 209 PCB 
[polychlorinated biphenyl] congeners ... Mixed 
chlorinated and brominated congeners also exist 
increasing the number of compounds considered dioxin-
LHealth Assessment Document for 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-Dioxin (TCDD) and Related Compounds, EPA/600/BP-92/001c, U.S. 
EPA, August 1994 at 9-1. Hereafter this document will be 
referred to as "EPA 1994." 
168708.1 16 
like-2 
• Extensive evidence has accumulated over the past 20 years 
to demonstrate that the immune system is a target for 
toxicity of ... TCDD [2,3,7,8 tetra chlorinated dioxins] 
and structurally related halogenated aromatic 
hydrocarbons (HAHs), including the polychlorinated 
dibenzofurans (PCDFs), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), 
and polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs). This evidence was 
derived from numerous studies in various animal species, 
primarily rodents, but also guinea pigs, rabbits, 
monkeys, marmosets, and cattle. Epidemiological studies 
also provide evidence for the immunotoxicity of HAHs in 
humans.3 
• The potential for dioxins and related compounds to cause 
reproductive and developmental toxicity has been 
recognized for many years. Recent laboratory studies 
have broadened our [EPA's] knowledge in this area and 
suggest that altered development may be among the most 
sensitive TCDD endpoints.4 
• There have been several long-term studies designed to 
determine if TCDD is a carcinogen in experimental 
animals. All of these studies have been positive and 
demonstrate that TCDD is a multi-site carcinogen, is a 
carcinogen in both sexes and in several species including 
the Syrian hamster, is a carcinogen in sites remote from 
the site of treatment, and increases cancer incidence at 
doses well below the MTD.5 
• The mechanistic basis for inter-individual variation is 
unclear, and this lack of knowledge complicates 
approaches to estimate human risks from experimental 
animal data. However, several studies indicate that, for 
the most part, humans appear to respond like experimental 
animals for biochemical and carcinogenic effects.6 
2 EPA 1994 at 9-6 to 9-7. 
3EPA 1994 at 4-1. 
4EPA 1994 at 5-1. 
5EPA 1994 at 6-38. 
6EPA 1994 at 6-39 to 6-40. 
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• TCDD alters a number of other pathways involved in the 
regulation of cell differentiation and proliferation. 
The specific relationships of these effects to multistage 
carcinogenesis are not known, but the broad array of 
effects on hormone systems, growth factor pathways, 
cytokines, and signal transduction components is 
consistent with the notion that TCDD is a powerful growth 
dysregulator.7 
• Human exposure to ... TCDD ... has been associated with 
non-cancer effects in most systems. The majority of 
effects have been reported among occupationally exposed 
groups, such as chemical production workers, pesticide 
users, and individuals who handled or were exposed to 
materials treated with ... TCDD-contaminated pesticides, 
and among residents of communities contaminated with 
tainted waste oil (Missouri, USA) and industrial effluent 
(Seveso, Italy).8 
• Estimates of exposure to dioxin-like CDDs and CDFs based 
on dietary intake are in the range of 1-3 pg TEQ/kg body 
weight/ day. Estimates based on the contribution of 
dioxin-like PCBs to toxicity equivalents raise the total 
to 3-6 pg TEQ/kg body weight/day. This range is used 
throughout this characterization [EPA reassessment] as an 
estimate of average background exposure to dioxin-like 
CDDs, CDFs, and PCBs. This average background exposure 
leads to body burdens in the human population that 
average 40-60 pg TEQ/ g lipid (40-60 ppt [parts per 
trillion]) when all dioxins, furans, and PCBs are 
included. High-end estimates of body burden of 
individuals in the general population (approximately the 
top 10% of the general population) may be greater than 
three times higher.9 
• With regard to average intake, humans are currently 
exposed to background levels of dioxin-like compounds on 
the order of 3-6 pg TEQ/kg body weight/day, including 
dioxin like PCBs. This is more than 500 fold higher than 
EPA's 1985 risk-specific dose associated with a plausible 
7EPA 1994 at 6-38. 
8EPA 1994 at 7-87. 
9EPA 1994 at 9-77 to 9-78. 
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upper bound, . . . and several hundredfold higher than 
revised risk specific dose estimates . . . Plausible 
upper-bound risk estimates for general population 
exposures to dioxin and related compounds, therefore, may 
be as high as ... one in ten thousand to one in a 
thousand ... .10 
• ... TCDD is the most potent form of a broad family of 
xenobiotics that bind to an intracellular protein known 
as the Ah receptor. Other members of this family include 
halogenated hydrocarbons such as the PCBs, naphthalenes, 
and dibenzofurans, as well as nonhalogenated species such 
as 3-methylcholanthrene and B-naphthaflavone. The 
biological properties of dioxins have been investigated 
extensively in over 5,000 publications and abstracts 
since the identification of TCDD as a chloracnegen 
[in 1957].n 
• From the complex picture that evolves from the . . . data, 
it is amply evident that TCDD elicits a plethora of toxic 
responses, both after short term and long term 
exposure.12 
• ... [B]ased on the results of two or more studies, recent 
evidence suggests that chloracne, elevated GGT13 levels, 
an increased risk of diabetes, and altered reproductive 
hormone levels (luteinizing hormone, follicle-stimulating 
hormone, and testosterone) appear to be long-term 
consequences of exposure to . . . TCDD ... .14 
• Based on all of the data reviewed in this reassessment 
and scientific inference, a picture emerges of TCDD and 
related compounds as potent toxicants in animals with the 
potential to produce a spectrum of effects. Some of 
these effects may be occurring in humans at very low 
levels and some may be resulting in adverse impacts on 
10EPA 1994 at 9-86. 
nEPA 1994 at 8-1. 
12EPA 1994 at 3-34. 
13
 Gamma glutamyl transpeptidase. 
14
 EPA 1994 at 7-238. 
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human health.15 
23. Government risk assessments of TOCDF and related 
facilities and scientific studies of dioxin provide a reasonable 
basis for concluding that the incineration of the chemical weapons 
waste at the TOCDF will lead to actual levels of dioxin and other 
toxic chemical exposure that will pose serious risk of harm to 
Petitioners and the public, including cancer, immune and 
reproductive system damage and other harmful effects to human 
health. 
24. The TOCDF incinerators will release such dangerous 
quantities of 2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin) and its equivalents 
(combinations of the other types of dioxins and furans) that even 
if only a small fraction of the dioxin emitted is captured by the 
food chain, great harm will occur to human health as well as to 
wildlife via, inter alia, cancer, reproductive and 
immunosuppressant effects. 
25. Dioxin is created by the incineration of wastes in 
general. EPA, DEQ and the Army admit that dioxin will be a product 
of incomplete combustion from the incineration process. 
26. The Respondents1 hazardous waste incineration operation at 
the TOCDF poses a serious imminent and substantial endangerment to 
human health and the environment, given all the facts stated supra 
and: 
15EPA 1994 at 9-87. 
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a) the failure of the above named Respondents to adequately 
analyzeand identify the toxic and hazardous contaminants expected 
to be present in the emissions from the TOCDF hazardous waste 
incinerators, and the toxicity of these emissions; 
b) the failures of the Respondents and DSHW to properly 
evaluate the risks to public health and the environment posed by 
the expected toxic emissions from the TOCDF incineration facility 
including, but not limited to, the health risks created for farmers 
and their families and breast-feeding infants; 
c) the incinerators1 inability to adequately destroy hazardous 
wastes and hazardous constituents including PCBs, dioxins, furans, 
blister agents and nerve agents and related chemicals at 
concentrations found in the waste feeds; 
d) the inability of existing pollution controls to adequately 
control toxic emissions from the facility; 
e) the nature of the acutely hazardous/toxic waste feed 
(including its chemical constituents and the concentrations of 
each) and resulting releases into the air of both unburned toxic 
chemicals and toxic metals in the waste feed, including nerve and 
blister agents, and toxic chemical by-products of incomplete 
combustion, including arsenic, lead, polychlorinated dibenzo-p-
dioxins, polychlorinated dibenzofurans, polychlorinated biphenyls, 
other dioxin-like chemicals and hundreds of other products of 
incomplete combustion (PICs), approximately 90% of which have yet 
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to be identified by the Respondents, EPA or any party, which toxic 
chemical releases will pose serious risk of harm to human health 
(cancer, immune and reproductive system damage and other effects) 
and the environment; 
f) the occurrence of upset conditions, off-normal conditions 
and accidents during operation of the incinerator facility which 
will result in even greater releases of toxic chemicals from the 
incinerator stack and fugitive emissions sources at the facility; 
g) the proximity of residential and agricultural areas and the 
existence of significant routes of human exposure to toxic 
chemicals, including nerve agents, released from the site, which 
include exposure via consumption of contaminated locally produced 
food including dairy products and locally grown beef, grains and 
produce, as well as via inhalation and direct contact with nerve 
agent and contaminated soil; 
h) the considerable evidence that nerve agent will be released 
from the TOCDF in substantial quantities if operation with live 
agent begins, which evidence includes the problematic performance 
of the JACADS prototype facility on Johnston Atoll, and confirmed 
release of live nerve agent at JACADS, for which the Army was fined 
by EPA, the risk assessments prepared for TOCDF as well as for the 
proposed Anniston, Alabama and Umatilla, Oregon facilities which 
report a significant risk of harmful acute exposures to nerve agent 
released from the facilities, and the recent disturbing disclosures 
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of former TOCDF safety officer Steve Jones regarding numerous 
safety and environmental violations and problems which the Army, 
DOD and EG&G have failed to address responsibly; and 
i) the virtual certainty that if agent is released from TOCDF 
in substantial quantities, such as in a maximum credible event 
(reasonable worst case accident or malfunction) fatalities will 
occur in the civilian population, and likely in large numbers, with 
as many as 1 fatality in every 100 persons exposed at a distance of 
15-40 miles. 
27. The Risk Assessments prepared for the Army and DEQ on the 
dangers of the TOCDF incineration project, while not admitting per 
se an unacceptable risk, provide evidence on their faces that the 
risk to public health of adverse heelth effects is significant as 
a result of toxic emissions from the incinerators. As one example, 
the dioxin exposures resulting from the dioxin emissions from the 
TOCDF incinerators which are admitted in the DEQ Risk Assessment, 
when taken together with existing dioxin exposures which are 
documented in EPAfs 1994 Dioxin Reassessment reports, would be 
expected to cause harm to local residents, based on simple 
calculations using EPA risk assessment methods. 
28. The Army and DEQ Risk Assessments also significantly 
underestimate the health risk from the TOCDF incinerators as a 
result of the omission in the risk assessments of entire categories 
of toxic chemical emissions, including nerve agent combustion and 
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degradation byproducts. Moreover, draft versions of the DEQ's risk 
assessment found unacceptable risks, but were later changed without 
public knowledge. 
29. Considering all of these circumstances, the incineration 
of nerve and blister agents, PCBs and other hazardous wastes by the 
Respondents at the TOCDF poses an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to public health and the environment. 
DESTRUCTION AND REMOVAL EFFICIENCY VIOLATIONS 
30. Respondents have failed to demonstrate compliance with the 
legal requirements for treating and disposing of hazardous waste 
via incineration. 
31. The chemical weapons wastes to be incinerated at the TOCDF 
are admitted by EPA and the Utah DEQ to be Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulated hazardous wastes subject to at 
least a 99.99% DRE requirement. RCRA requires via federal 
regulations, which are adopted by Utah, that a 99.99% destruction 
and removal efficiency (DRE) be achieved on the key hazardous 
constituents (the principal organic hazardous constituents or 
POHCs) included in the wastes during the post-trial burn 
incineration process, in addition to requiring a demonstration of 
a 99.99% DRE during a trial burn. £££ UAC §§ R315-8-15.3, 15.4, 
40 C.F.R. §§ 264.342, 264.343. 
32. As a result of a recently discovered but poorly understood 
scientific phenomenon, chemicals in the waste feed in low 
concentrations are difficult to destroy at high destruction 
efficiencies. Chemicals present in the waste feed to an 
incinerator at concentrations of less than 1,000 parts per million 
(ppm) will not be incinerated at a 99.9999% DRE and chemicals in 
the incinerator waste feed at concentrations of less than 100 ppm 
will not achieve a 99.99% DRE. 
33. This is a phenomenon which EPA has studied, documented and 
acknowledges (EPA, Kramlich 1993). 
34. The TOCDF dunnage incinerator and metal parts furnace will 
be burning materials contaminated with nerve agent and other 
hazardous wastes that have a concentration of less than 1000 ppm in 
some cases and even less than 100 ppm in some cases. 
35. Consequently, Respondents will be unable to consistently 
destroy the nerve agents, which are POHCs in the TOCDF chemical 
weapons wastes, to the 99.99% destruction and removal efficiency 
(DRE) required by law using the currently proposed incineration 
technology for the TOCDF metal parts furnace and the TOCDF dunnage 
incinerator. The excess nerve, blister agent and other hazardous 
waste emissions resulting from this failure to achieve a 99.99% DRE 
during the production burn violate the DRE regulation, as well as 
pose a health threat to workers and the public. 
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INABILITY TO PREVENT AND MINIMIZE RELEASES OF AGENT AND 
HAZARDOUS WASTES 
36. RCRA and its Utah counterpart, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924 
and 6925 and 40 C.F.R. Part 264 (e.g. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.15; 264.31; 
264.347; UAC R315-8-2.6; UAC R315-8-3.2; UAC R315-8-15.7), require 
Respondents to take all necessary actions to prevent and minimize 
releases of hazardous wastes and hazardous waste constituents into 
the environment. 
37. The Army, DOD and EG&G have failed to take the required 
measures to prevent release of nerve and blister agent from the 
TOCDF facility in light of the problematic performance of the 
JACADS and CAMDS prototype facilities and confirmed releases of 
live nerve agent, for which the Army was fined by EPA at JACADS, 
and the numerous unexplained "false" alarms from the Army's air and 
emissions monitoring systems signaling the release of live nerve 
agent. 
38. The risk assessments prepared for TOCDF as well as for the 
proposed Anniston, Alabama chemical weapons incineration facility 
report a significant risk of harmful acute exposures to nerve agent 
released from the facilities. 
39. Recent disturbing disclosures have been made by former 
TOCDF chief safety officer Steve Jones regarding numerous safety 
and environmental violations and problems at TOCDF which could lead 
to releases of nerve and blister agent. Many of these violations 
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and problems remain uncorrected. 
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL AND UTAH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
REQUIREMENTS 
40. Respondents are not in compliance with the emergency 
preparedness and contingency plan requirements of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. 
Subpart C and D; UAC R315-8-3.1, 3.7, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.6. Also see 
RCRA Permit for TOCDF, § II.H.4.b. The Army, DOD and EG&G are ill 
prepared to respond to a release of nerve agent at TOCDF in terms 
of planning, equipment, personnel training, off-site treatment 
capability and coordination with hospitals and emergency response 
personnel. The required personnel training has not been completed. 
The required cooperative agreements with emergency response 
agencies have not been effected, and the requisite off-site 
treatment capability does not exist. 
41. The required emergency response plans for TOCDF, both on-
site and off-site, must be designed around the reasonable worst 
case event or release of nerve agent and hazardous chemicals 
(maximum credible event). However, the Respondents have yet to 
identify or reveal the nature of such a reasonable worst case event 
and have not designed their emergency response plans to deal with 
such an event. 
42. The Respondent Army had initiated such an analysis of a 
maximum credible incinerator stack release of unburned nerve agent 
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which indicated that even at 40 miles beyond the TOCDF boundary 
10,000 fatalities would occur per million population (one percent 
fatalities). Former Army Inspector General's Office inspector and 
former Chief TOCDF safety officer Steve Jones observed work in 
progress on this analysis during a past inspection at TOCDF but the 
Army has acted as if such an analysis does not exist. 
IV. RELIEF REQUESTED 
Based upon the foregoing analysis and the attached supporting 
documents, Petitioners request the following: 
1. A formal hearing on the issues raised herein, including 
adequate time for discovery. 
2. Consolidation of this RFA / Intervention with Petitioners1 
First RFA. 
3. Reversal by the Board of the DSHW's approvals noted 
herein. 
4. An order from the Board preventing the Respondents from 
beginning any shakedown, trial burn, and/or other operations 
involving the treatment, storage, or disposal of nerve agents, 
blister agents, and any other hazardous waste at TOCDF. 
5. An order from the Board requiring that Petitioners are 
fully compensated for all fees and costs associated with this 
hearing process. 
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6. Any other relief that the Board deems just and 
appropriate, 
Respectfully submitted, 
!•<£- £7 Jc 
Mick G. Harrison, Esq. 
Director, GreenLaw, Inc. 
Robert Ukeiley, Esq. 
Ashley C. Schannauer, Esq. 
Richard E. Condit, Esq. 
GreenLaw, Inc. 
505 N. Walnut 
Bloomington, IN 47404 
(812) 339-2605 (voice) 
(812) 339-2620 (fax) 
Robert Guild, Esq. 
attorney at Law 
314 Pall Mall 
Columbia, SC 29201 
(803) 252-1419 (voice and fax; 
Counsel for Petitioners 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of Petitioners1 Second Request 
for Action and/or Intervention was served on Respondents on this 
^l/^aay of J^ (^  , 1996 by serving copies to the parties listed 
below in the manner indicated. 
Robert Ukgi^%y 
VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID 
David W. Tunderman 
Craig D. Galli 
Michael A. Zody 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Ste. 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
(801) 532-1234 
(801) 536-6111 (Fax) 
Counsel for EG&G 
Capt. Michael E. Mulligan 
Gerald P. Kohns 
Department of the Army 
901 North Stuart Street 
Arlington, VA 22203-1837 
Alan Greenberg 
Environmental Defense Section 
U.S. Dept. of Justice 
999 18th Street 
Ste. 945, North Tower 
Denver, CO 80202 
(303) 312-7324 
(303) 294-1931 
Counsel for the Army and DOD 
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